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David Boerner and Roxanne Lieb
Sentencing Reform in the
Other Washington
ABSTRACT
Washington State's sentencing reform in the early 1980s encompassed all
felonies, including those resulting in sentences to prison and jail; the state
also enacted the first and only sentencing guidelines for juvenile offenders.
Several lessons are suggested from Washington's experience: sentencing
guidelines can change sentencing patterns and can reduce disparities
among offenders who are sentenced for similar crimes and have similar
criminal histories; a sentencing commission does not operate as an
independent political force, except when such delegation serves the
legislature's purpose; guidelines are policy-neutral technologies that can
be harnessed to achieve the legislature's will; in states where citizen
initiatives are authorized, sentencing issues will appear on the ballot,
attract political support, and make significant changes to sentencing
policy; guidelines allow a state to set sentences with advance knowledge of
the consequences to prison and jail populations; guidelines are likely to
become more complex over time as legislators strive to respond to new
perceptions of crime seriousness, while simultaneously paying attention to
prison and jail costs.
Twenty years ago, Washington State enacted what at that time was the
most comprehensive reform of adult sentencing laws in the nation.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 rejected many core tenets of inde-
terminate sentencing, putting into place a sentencing system based on
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principles of just desert and accountability. Since then, the legislature
has not been shy about changing the act; it has been revised each year
since its enactment. Sentences in 1999 differ significantly from those
imposed in 1984; many are longer and require more conditions. Nev-
ertheless, the act reached the millennium structurally intact.
The American experience with sentencing reform now spans a quar-
ter century (Tonry 1996, chap. 1). Many of the reformers' goals have
been achieved in at least some jurisdictions. Some were unrealistic or
carried unintended consequences. Washington's reform is of particular
interest because of its scope: the legislation encompassed all felonies,
including those resulting in sentences to probation and jail; the state
also enacted the first and only sentencing guidelines for juvenile of-
fenders.
Washington's story suggests a number of lessons about sentencing
guidelines. First, in contrast to mandatory sentences, which are rarely
implemented as intended, sentencing guidelines can significantly
change sentencing patterns. Second, guidelines can reduce disparities
among offenders who are sentenced for similar crimes and have similar
criminal histories. Third, unconstrained discretion in sentencing oper-
ates to favor whites and disfavor members of minority groups.
Washington's story also suggests lessons about the roles and powers
of various institutions. First, sentencing commissions derive their
power from the legislature and do not operate as an independent polit-
ical force, except in circumstances where delegation to this body serves
the legislature's purpose. Second, guidelines are policy-neutral tech-
nologies that can be harnessed to achieve the legislature's will. The
legislature will use its power over sentencing policy in different ways
at different times. Third, in states where citizens' initiatives are autho-
rized, initiatives concerning sentencing are likely to appear on the bal-
lot, attract popular support, and effect significant changes. Fourth,
guidelines allow a state to set sentences with advance knowledge of the
consequences to prison and jail populations and thereby to project nec-
essary correctional resources. Thus, the branch of government setting
the sentences also writes the check, increasing the opportunity for pru-
dent resource management. Fifth, guidelines are likely to become in-
creasingly complex over time, as legislators strive to respond to new
perceptions of crime seriousness, while simultaneously paying atten-
tion to prison and jail costs.
Finally, any change in sentencing laws, procedures, and processes
will alter the distribution of discretionary powers. Guidelines shift the
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allocation of discretion; actors and agencies that lose discretion will
work to regain it. Voluntary prosecutorial guidelines at the state level
will not control charging and plea-bargaining practices. The idiosyn-
cratic nature of this aspect of prosecutors' work, coupled with the com-
plex patterns of interaction between the prosecutors and defense attor-
neys, means that outside scrutiny is unattainable.
This essay is divided into six sections. Section I discusses the 1970s
reformers' vision and the history of legislative actions leading up to
adoption of guidelines legislation (1975-81). The first five years of the
work of Washington's guidelines commission are described in Section
II, including the development of the sentencing grid and related poli-
cies (1981-86). The period 1986-92 is covered in Section III; during
this time, the legislature reinstated itself as the source of policy direc-
tion. Section IV covers 1993-95, when citizen initiatives dominated
state sentencing policy. We review experience since 1995 in Section V
and conclude in Section VI.
I. The Reformers' Era, 1975-81
Washington's first sentencing laws were enacted at the turn of the cen-
tury. The state was an early and enthusiastic convert to the rehabilita-
tive ideal and indeterminacy, and it granted wide and unconstrained
discretion to judges and correctional officials (Boerner 1985, pp. 2-3).
Judges were authorized to choose between prison and probation with
few exceptions, subject only to review for abuse of discretion. Proba-
tion could be coupled with a jail term of up to one year, and judges
had unrestricted authority to impose conditions of probation. Prison
sentences were imposed at the statutory maximum, with the parole
board having authority to set release dates for those whose rehabilita-
tion was "complete" and judged a "fit subject for release" (Wash. Rev.
Code, title 9, chap. 95, sec. 100 [2001]). Judges made recommenda-
tions about minimum terms but had no power to set minimum terms
or prescribe parole conditions.
A handful of the most serious crimes carried mandatory terms of im-
prisonment. In all other matters, the parole board's discretion to release,
and to impose parole conditions, was essentially unrestrained. Taken as
a whole, Washington fit Zimring's description of a "labyrinthine" sen-
tencing and corrections system that "lacks any principle except unguided
discretion" (Zimring 1977, p. 6). This characterization was also valid for
the state's juvenile system, which was established in 1913.
Washington's sentencing policies must be understood in the context
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of the division of power between state and local government. Both his-
torically and at present, many political decisions about sentencing poli-
cies are influenced by whether the local or the state government pays
the price. Washington's state prison system houses adult felons with
sentences over one year; sentences of one year or less are served in
jails and are the responsibility of local government. Supervision in the
community, to the extent it is authorized, is a state responsibility. In
the juvenile system, local authorities operate the diversion and proba-
tion programs and the detention centers; the state operates the institu-
tions for those with sentences over a year and administers parole.
A. Options, 1975
Sentencing reform in Washington encompassed both the juvenile
and adult sentencing codes. Because they were enacted separately-the
juvenile reform in 1977 and the adult in 1981-and because the two
systems are typically seen as worlds apart, this story is usually bifur-
cated. Connecting them, however, reveals their shared philosophical
base and the breadth of reformist vision.
The story begins in 1975 with the House of Representatives' cre-
ation of a new subcommittee of the Social and Health Services Com-
mittee. This subcommittee was given a wide-ranging assignment that
encompassed both adult and juvenile correctional systems. Representa-
tive Ron Hanna, the chair, had worked in juvenile corrections and was
passionate about wanting to change the system. The committee's
membership was unusual for the time, in that it was not numerically
dominated by legislators representing districts with large correctional
institutions. One member, Representative Mary Kay Becker, noted
that the group viewed its task differently than did most legislative com-
mittees. The clear goal, she noted, was to develop state policy, rather
than to review proposals from organizations (Becker 1979, p. 298).
During 1975, the committee visited most of the state's juvenile cor-
rectional institutions with two aims: viewing the facilities and hearing
from administrators, staff, residents, agencies, and the general public.
Everywhere the committee went, meetings were arranged so they
could interact with people who spent their days working with juvenile
and adult offenders. They focused on a simple, powerful question:
How can the state do a better job?
The tour proved invaluable. Committee members gained close-hand
knowledge of state facilities and talked with a wide range of people.
They developed access to a network of experts outside the state capital,
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contacts that proved valuable later in testing reactions to proposed leg-
islation.
The tour also revealed that the views and priorities of organizations
they typically relied on concerning juvenile issues were out of tune
with those of others in the system. The juvenile court administrators
and judges became seen by the committee as strongly vested in the sta-
tus quo and unwilling to examine the effects of their decisions and
practices. As the system was constructed, the state paid for juvenile in-
stitutions and group home beds, with local government covering other
costs. This gave local government representatives a strong financial in-
centive to decide that youth offenders needed to be institutionalized
or removed from their families. The lack of interest of these groups in
altering this arrangement caused the reformers to look elsewhere for
political support.
The committee also became aware of the national debate that was
challenging the rehabilitative underpinnings of sentencing and correc-
tions. The desirability of individualized decision making was a premise
of these systems in the United States for most of the 1900s. In the
early 1970s, the U.S. Parole Commission challenged this norm by ana-
lyzing the patterns of its decision making, then devising a guidelines
matrix based largely on past practice (Gottfredson, Wilkins, and Hoff-
man 1978). This approach did not require agreement ahead of time on
sentencing purposes or appropriate penalties. The analysis was de-
scriptive, based on examining past decisions and describing the pat-
terns. From that point, decision makers thinking about sentencing and
parole had the option to mirror historical practices or to set new policy
directions.
Influential individuals in Washington were reading about the U.S.
Parole Commission and studying the works of Marvin Frankel (1972),
Norval Morris (1974), and Kenneth Culp Davis (1969), among others.
By 1975, the King County prosecutor, Christopher T. Bayley, was ad-
vocating a radical departure from the individual treatment model for
sentencing. Bayley argued for a fundamental change based on the fol-
lowing philosophy. First, punishment-expressed as a loss of liberty-
should follow conviction for every serious crime. Second, the amount
of punishment should be determined by the seriousness of the crime
the defendant committed. Third, other factors, such as the defendant's
need for treatment, his or her attitude, or predictions of future danger-
ousness, are irrelevant. Fourth, variations must be permitted in indi-
vidual cases, for it is impossible to foresee every future possibility, but
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these exceptions must be principled and supported by written reasons
(Bayley 1976a).
A 1975 Governor's Task Force proposal brought this debate to pub-
lic attention. The task force's proposal pushed the rehabilitative ideal
to its outer limits. It proposed abolishing all distinctions in punish-
ment between crimes, thus severing the proportionality link between
crime and punishment. All felonies, regardless of severity, were to be
punishable by an indeterminate sentence of not more than five years.
A category of "dangerous offenders," subject to an indeterminate life
sentence, was to be reserved for the most serious offenders (Gover-
nor's Task Force on Decision Making Models in Corrections 1975).
The proposal's proponents were articulate advocates of the "rehabili-
tative ideal" and sought to extend it to its logical conclusion (Allen
1981).
The political response to the proposal was quick and sharp, with
prosecutor Bayley leading the charge in the press. The controversy
soon evolved into a major public debate on sentencing and its pur-
poses. In December 1975, Bayley sponsored a conference on this topic
that included addresses by such national figures as Norval Morris and
Robert Martinson. A subsequent University of Washington Law Review
issue featured articles from a variety of perspectives (Symposium 1976).
The political stakes were revealed in the next election. Two superior
court judges in King County, both vocal supporters of the rehabilita-
tive ideal, were defeated in their bids for reelection. Both were well-
respected jurists. Incumbent judges were rarely challenged during this
period and even more rarely unseated. The election upset was remark-
able.
B. The Juvenile System
Starting in the 1970s, pressures to alter the state's juvenile system
began to mount from numerous sources, including U.S. Supreme
Court decisions, population increases in state juvenile institutions, and
concerns about upward trends in juvenile crime rates. Several U.S. Su-
preme Court decisions had mandated due process and procedural safe-
guards for juveniles (Feld 1998). In addition, financial incentives from
the federal government encouraged states to remove status offenders
from juvenile court jurisdiction (Becker 1979, p. 292).
Between 1969 and 1975, the Washington legislature had repeatedly
considered comprehensive juvenile justice reform proposals, and al-
though most passed at least one house, all died before passage. The
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proposals were drafted by a variety of groups, including the Judicial
Council, Northwest Washington Legal Services, and superior court
judges. The failure of the proposals was caused by the serious polariza-
tion of interests: one group's remedy was antithetical to others (Becker
1979, p. 295). A recent increase in commitments to state juvenile insti-
tutions added to concerns about the juvenile system, particularly in
terms of state budget implications.
By 1976, Representative Hanna's subcommittee reached consensus
on changes to the juvenile system. They chose to tackle the juvenile
laws first because the sense of political and practical urgency was far
greater, thus offering more political opportunity. The subcommittee
came to four key conclusions. Expenses for juvenile treatment had in-
creased continuously without a significant increase in the rate of effec-
tiveness. Rather than emphasize treatment, the system should empha-
size work as a productive, therapeutic endeavor. Crisis intervention
programs for families were the key to keeping children out of the court
and institutional system. For the juvenile courts, a pilot project should
experiment with the determinate sentencing model proposed by Mar-
vin Wolfgang, in which the "strictness of the sentence would be re-
lated to the severity and frequency of the child's criminal behavior"
(Substitute House Resolution 46, 44th Legislature, 2d Extraordinary
Sess. 1 [1976]).
Committee leaders pressed forward. More "accountability," both by
offenders and by the system, emerged as a powerful rallying point. In
June 1976, a legislative subcommittee reviewed a document prepared
by a nonpartisan staff member that defined three major deficiencies of
the existing juvenile system. First, the system was not accountable to
citizens. No way had been found to measure its performance. Its ends
were unclear, the means inconsistent. Second, the system did not hold
youthful offenders accountable. Violent offenders often had their cases
handled informally, while misdemeanants and nonviolent offenders
went to court. Third, the system was unable to help offenders. The
conflict between the punishment and rehabilitation roles of probation
workers and institutional officers undermined their ability to help, and
juvenile crime had been increasing, undermining the system's effec-
tiveness (Naon 1976, p. 41).
Other aspects of the juvenile code were controversial, particularly
concerning responses to truants, runaways, and youth in conflict with
their families. Finding political consensus on these issues was an excep-
tional challenge. When a crime is committed, the state's role is clear:
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to restore balance to the social contract. When a juvenile runs to the
streets and refuses to return home, the state's role is more ambiguous.
Should the state arrest and confine the youth in a detention facility or
an institution? Does the answer change if the youth left home because
of physical or sexual abuse by a parent? As the elements for reform of
the offender side of the law took shape, the political consensus for sta-
tus offenders was more elusive (Lieb and Brown 1999, p. 274).
1. Bipartisan Coalition Supports Reform. By January 1977, a bill to
reform the offender side of the juvenile code was introduced, and a
broad coalition of supporters testified. A bipartisan coalition spanned
the political spectrum, including the American Civil Liberties Union,
Legal Services, the defense bar, prosecutors, crime victims, and law en-
forcement. The King County Prosecutor's Office sent two attorneys to
the state capitol to keep the bill alive and help resolve disagreements. A
separate bill regarding status offenders was introduced in the Senate;
eventually, both bills were combined (House Bill 371, 45th Leg., Ex-
traordinary Sess., 1977). This consolidation increased the political mo-
mentum and support base and allowed the leaders to break the previ-
ous political logjams.
The "missing links" in the reform coalition were juvenile court ad-
ministrators and probation staff, some of whom actively lobbied in op-
position. Because these groups had become identified as "defenders of
the status quo," their resistance was viewed as predictable. Judges did
not actively support or oppose the law; a later survey revealed that at
the time, many believed the legislation had little chance of passing
(Steiger and Doyan 1979).
Because many sections of the bill were drafted quickly, and the sys-
tem changes were enormous, a clause that delayed implementation for
one year helped to garner votes. The plan was to spend the next ses-
sion perfecting the legislation. For reasons unrelated to the juvenile
law, the governor surprised the state in 1978 by not calling a legislative
session, something that had rarely occurred in recent history. Thus,
the legislation went into effect in 1978 with some internal contradic-
tions (House Bill 371, 45th Leg., 1st Extraordinary Sess. [1977] Codi-
fied at Wash. Rev. Code, title 13).
2. Juvenile Guidelines. The legislation radically altered the juvenile
justice system. Decision making was formalized, with discretion shifted
from probation staff to the prosecutor. Previously, probation counsel-
ors decided which cases to keep out of court and which to refer to
prosecutors; it was a decision-making process described as based often
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on "extra-legal factors and idiosyncratic choice" (Schneider and
Schram 1983, p. 24). Due process rights and other procedural guaran-
tees were provided to juveniles. Juvenile courts could no longer shift
the costs of delinquent youth to the state by committing them to state
care and instead the courts were given incentives to use less onerous
local sanctions.
The law established standards for a sentencing system based on age,
offense, and prior history. Courts were given discretion to depart from
the guidelines, if necessary, to impose a just sentence. This provision,
labeled a "manifest injustice sentence," could be used to increase or
reduce the amount of punishment; written reasons were necessary and
the sentence could be appealed.
The 1977 act created a new commission to review and evaluate the
sentencing and dispositional aspects of the law. The Washington State
Juvenile Disposition Standards Commission was directed to report to
the legislature every two years regarding changes to the sentencing
grid. The body was given substantial authority-its recommendations
went into effect unless modified by the legislature. Although the com-
mission's responsibilities paralleled those of the typical adult sentenc-
ing commission, its structure and operations were far less independent.
The ten-member panel was chaired by the division director of juvenile
institutions.
Implementation moved to the state agency responsible for juvenile
institutions, the Department of Social and Health Services. The
agency assigned Warren Netherland, an institutional warden, to over-
see the task. Netherland was a strong believer in the just deserts phi-
losophy and a strategic thinker. Working with a broad coalition, he
solicited the views and suggestions of groups with a stake in the re-
form. When it came time to draft the guidelines, Netherland worked
with a hand-picked group and exercised control over all decisions. The
sentencing standards took effect July 1, 1979.
The standards commission early on set operating procedures that re-
quired consensus decisions before statutory changes were recom-
mended. Since the membership included prosecutors and the defense
bar, it was difficult to reach agreement on major changes in sentencing.
During the first decade of the group's operation, revisions to the
guidelines were primarily technical in nature. Its recommendations
were not controversial and were either adopted as proposed or allowed
to take effect without modification (Steiger 1998, p. 343). By the sec-
ond decade, however, juvenile crime again became a topic of political
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debate, and key legislators grew frustrated with the body's inaction.
Eventually, the juvenile standards commission was eliminated and its
functions were transferred in 1996 to the adult sentencing commission.
The political climate that influenced changes in the state's juvenile
system was equally focused on adult sentencing. Here, though, the re-
form process was slower.
C. Voluntary Parole Guidelines Falter
The experiences of the U.S. Parole Commission in developing
guidelines influenced Washington's Board of Prison Terms and Pa-
roles. Beginning in 1974, members began discussing matrix guidelines
as a possible remedy for perceived disparities. At that time, the board
had jurisdiction over more than 12,000 individuals, including approxi-
mately 4,000 in the prison system (Petersen and Gearhart 1979).
In 1975, the board agreed to "establish explicit policy and rationale
for Board decision-making" (Patrick and Petersen 1979, p. 3). Ac-
cording to a board document, this decision was "undoubtedly acti-
vated, if not induced, by the introduction of determinate sentencing
legislation in the 1975 legislative session" (Patrick and Petersen 1979,
p. 3). Several advantages were envisioned. With explicit criteria, ratio-
nales for decisions would be clearer and more understandable to of-
fenders and the public. Disparities in decision making would be re-
duced. Board practices could be evaluated by comparison with explicit
policy (Patrick and Petersen 1979, p. 3).
The board sought and received a three-year grant in 1976 from the
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the U.S. Department
of Justice to develop and implement guidelines. In July 1976, the board
adopted a matrix model to fix minimum terms of confinement that di-
vided crimes into thirteen categories. For each offense category, low,
medium, and high ranges were set according to the perceived likeli-
hood of parole success.
In fall 1977, researchers concluded that board members were gener-
ally ignoring the guidelines (Patrick and Petersen 1979, p. 11). By the
following spring, three new members joined the board, including a
new chairman. The guidelines fell into disuse. The effort revived in
1978 with a new set of guidelines based on a consensus process in
which board members assigned weights to hypothetical cases. This
version, however, did not influence decision making to a great extent;
overall, the board stayed inside these guidelines only about 63 percent
of the time (Patrick and Petersen 1979, p. 17). A similar compliance
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rate could have been achieved by setting one guideline sentence of
thirty-six months. In practice, thirty-six months was the minimum
term sentence selected by board members for about 60 percent of of-
fenders (Barnoski 2000).
InJanuary 1979, the board revised the guidelines to reduce the num-
ber of crime categories from thirteen to eight and adopted guidelines
for parole violations. In June 1979, compliance in minimum term set-
ting was again found to be modest: terms were set within the guide-
lines in less than two-thirds of cases. The researchers concluded that
even though the board as a collective body was committed to the
guidelines, the individual practices of members suggested that "the de-
gree of its collective commitment lacks the intensity necessary to real-
ize one of the primary objectives of the guidelines: reduction of dispar-
ity in minimum terms set for similar offenses" (Patrick and Petersen
1979, p. 44). Only one of the 163 departures from the guidelines was
accompanied by a written justification, even though board policy re-
quired justification in each departure. The report concluded that board
members, "individually and collectively, must decide whether they can
and will totally support the guideline policy. If the entire membership
of the Board agrees to support and conduct their decision-making re-
sponsibilities under the tenets of the guideline policy, they must be
prepared to exercise peer pressure in the prevention of penal philoso-
phy that is in conflict with the collective philosophy" (Patrick and Pe-
tersen 1979, p. 44).
The controversy within the board about the guidelines, and the
modest levels of compliance, suggested that voluntary guidelines were
an unlikely means to control this body's discretion.
D. Voluntary Sentencing and Prosecution Guidelines
Also responding to the public debate, the Superior Court Judges As-
sociation adopted judicial guidelines in 1978. Like the parole board's
initial effort, the judicial guidelines were designed to reflect past prac-
tice. The guidelines covered the jail versus prison decision (sentences
under a year in Washington are served in jail; others are prison sen-
tences), and maximum sentence length. The guidelines were voluntary;
no statute or court rule required compliance or even consideration by
individual judges. A 1981 study found that judges used the guidelines
in 70 percent of cases, and of those, 66 percent were within the guide-
lines (State of Washington Superior Court Judges Association and Of-
fice of the Administrator for the Courts 1981).
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The state's prosecuting attorneys also adopted guidelines. King
County developed office policies for filing and disposition decisions in
the early 1970s (Bayley 1976b, 1978). Several other counties followed,
and in 1980, uniform (but voluntary) charging and disposition policies
were adopted by the Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys
(1980).
In some states, similar voluntary restrictions on discretion averted
legislative action (e.g., in Maryland and, for a time, Florida; Carrow
1984). It is ironic that Washington's experience with voluntary guide-
lines adopted by the parole board, the judiciary, and prosecutors taught
two lessons: guidelines were a legitimate means to control discretion,
and voluntary guidelines were not likely to reduce disparity because
compliance will be modest.
E. Adult Sentencing Reform
The leaders in the House of Representatives who championed juve-
nile sentencing reform applied the same principles to reform of adult
sentencing. Legislation drafted in the King County Prosecutor's Of-
fice, first introduced in 1977 and based on just deserts principles,
passed the House of Representatives but died in the Senate. The same
thing happened in 1979.
Reform pressures did not abate, however, and in 1980, a bipartisan
select committee on corrections was appointed by the House of Repre-
sentatives to concentrate on adult sentencing. This committee, led by
Representatives Mary Kay Becker and Gene Struthers, spent months
conducting hearings across the state and debating alternatives. Repre-
sentative Becker had been a leader in the juvenile reform legislation.
Norm Maleng, who had replaced Christopher Bayley as King County
Prosecuting Attorney, became a strong advocate for reform. Maleng's
chief of staff, Robert Lasnik, became the principal lobbyist for the pro-
posal.
The committee considered the experiences of other states with sen-
tencing reforms and studied the reform arguments and proposals. Ulti-
mately, the committee drafted legislation that drew on national reform
proposals, but selectively. The legislation reflected a consensus of oth-
erwise disparate interests and groups. (Representative Becker jokingly
described the unlikely consensus between herself, a liberal Democrat,
and Representative Struthers, a conservative Republican, as akin to
"Jane Fonda and John Wayne co-authoring a book on the history of
the Vietnam War" [Seattle Post-Intelligencer 1984, p. 4A].) The coali-
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tion of disparate political groups supporting the reform mirrored the
state's experiences with juvenile sentencing reform and presaged the
consensus that would later be reached in other states and the federal
government in adopting sentencing guidelines (Stith and Koh 1993).
Following House passage, the proposed reform legislation moved to
the Senate, where it had stalled each session since 1977. No hearing
was expected, as the judiciary committee chair was on record as oppos-
ing determinate sentencing. Serendipitously, control of the Senate
shifted when a Democratic senator switched party affiliation a third of
the way through the session. The new Republican chair of the judiciary
committee supported sentencing reform, and thus the reform package
developed by the House select committee moved quickly, was ap-
proved by the Senate, and was passed into law in 1981. Implementa-
tion was delayed until 1984; a newly created sentencing guidelines
commission was directed to develop the sentencing grid and related
policies.
Although the final vote on the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 was
virtually unanimous, this result masked opposition by two key
groups-judges and corrections officials. As with the juvenile reform,
these opponents played significant roles in the system and had the po-
tential to block legislative action. Judges resented the reform's restric-
tions on their discretion, but they were a disorganized political force.
The governor, John Spellman, was not a strong proponent, but he
had not played a major role on criminal justice issues and chose not to
involve himself in the deliberations. Coincidentally, his legal counsel,
as a King County deputy prosecutor, had played an instrumental role
in the juvenile reform. The secretary of corrections, Amos Reed, did
not take a public stand. Later, on April 22, 1983, when the bill-signing
ceremony occurred, the governor commented to the secretary, "Well,
Amos, we didn't think this bill would ever pass, did we?"
F. The 1981 Reform Bill
The legislature's central role in sentencing reform distinguished,
and continues to distinguish, Washington from many other states that
enacted commission-centered reforms. Unlike Minnesota's commis-
sion, described as having "primary control over the setting of statewide
sentencing policy" (Frase 1993, p. 337), the Washington commission's
role was advisory from the beginning. Washington's legislature never
delegated its power over sentencing. When it revoked its long-stand-
ing delegation of sentencing policy to judges and the parole board, the
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legislature did not redelegate this authority to a commission. The
commission was to serve a valuable role by crafting details and provid-
ing policy advice, but the legislature intended to control sentencing
policy.
When the Washington commission started work, the legislature had
already resolved many sentencing policy issues. Their scope and detail
were influenced by two factors. First, reformers had worked on the
measure for seven years, negotiating and crafting resolutions to con-
cerns from organizations and legislators. Second, the state already had
experience with juvenile guidelines and there were aspects of that law
that reformers either wanted to duplicate or to avoid in the adult sys-
tem. To a smaller extent, Minnesota's experiences with sentencing
guidelines were known and offered policy makers a chance either to
mirror that state's law or to take different approaches.
The legislative framework included the following elements:
Just Deserts Emphasis. The multiple-and often inconsistent-pur-
poses of sentencing were integrated into principled coexistence, with
just deserts the primary but not exclusive purpose.
Truth and Certainty. All sentences were to be determinate; that is,
both length and conditions were to be known "with exactitude"
(Wash. Rev. Code, title 9, chap. 94A, sec. 030[16] [2001]) at the time
imposed, with the sole exception of provisions allowing up to a one-
third reduction in sentence for good behavior in jail or prison. The
power of courts to suspend or defer sentences was abolished, as were
parole release and supervision.
Structuring but Not Eliminating Discretion. Sentencing ranges of
prescribed-and relatively narrow-width were to be based solely on
the crime of conviction and the offender's criminal history (Wash. Rev.
Code, title 9, chap. 94A, sec. 40 [2001]). The sentencing ranges were
presumptive, not mandatory; judges could depart from the range with
written justification, subject to substantive appellate review (Wash.
Rev. Code, title 9, chap. 94A, sec. 120[3] [2001]). The commission was
to develop the nation's first statewide prosecutorial guidelines covering
charging decisions and plea agreements.
Rehabilitation Given a Limited Focus. Sentences intended to rehabili-
tate offenders were restricted to a defined class of first-time, nonviolent
offenders (Wash. Rev. Code, title 9, chap. 94A, sec. 120[5] [2001]).
This group was seen as composed of excellent candidates for treat-
ment-oriented sanctions. For all other sentences, sentence conditions
were restricted to "crime-related prohibitions," not the performance
HeinOnline  -- 28 Crime. & Just. 84 2001
Sentencing Reform in the Other Washington
of affirmative conduct (Wash. Rev. Code, title 9, chap. 94A, sec. 030
[2001]). Crime-related prohibitions were intended to relate specifically
to the offense of conviction, for example, for a sex offender, a prohibi-
tion against unsupervised contact with minors.
Shift in Priorities. In setting the ranges, the commission was to
"emphasize confinement for the violent offender and alternatives to
total confinement for the non-violent offender" (Wash. Rev. Code, ti-
tle 9, chap. 94A, sec. 040[5] [2001]).
Setting the Price Tag. The commission was directed to estimate the
impact of the guidelines on prison and jail populations, but current ca-
pacity need not dictate sentencing policy.
Legislative Control. The legislature retained its authority over sen-
tencing, with the guidelines commission serving in an advisory ca-
pacity.
The commission's task was to develop guidelines that would im-
plement these policy decisions. The legislation called for a fifteen-
member body of criminal justice professionals, state agency leaders,
and citizens; four legislators served as nonvoting members.
The governor's decisions on commission appointments were greatly
influenced by his legal counsel, Marilyn Showalter. Showalter under-
stood the need to appoint members who could tackle the substantive
and political challenges ahead. The designated chair, Donna Schram,
was a citizen with extensive experience in criminal justice research, in-
cluding a major evaluation of the state's juvenile justice reform
(Schneider et al. 1981). Norm Maleng was appointed as one of the
prosecutor's representatives and was later elected by the group as its
first vice chair. The judicial, prosecutorial, and defense bar representa-
tives were highly respected by their peers. The commission set to work
late in 1981.
II. The Commission's Era, 1981-86
Washington's commission began its work where every sentencing
commission begins-by concentrating on the criminal code, crime
definitions, and dissecting the degrees of harm represented by various
crimes. For several months, commission members worked in subcom-
mittees in which they had ample opportunities to engage in under-
standing the legislation and each other's experiences and views.
The chair was careful to incorporate extensive discussions into the
meetings and for several months took very few votes. She understood
that for the commission to succeed, members had eventually to set
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aside their "representative" statuses and instead to view themselves as
part of a body with greater responsibility to the state.
The staff organized research to document past sentencing practices.
While the reform was to be prescriptive, not merely descriptive, past
practices were seen as an essential baseline. For offenders sent to
prison, parole board and Washington State Department of Correc-
tions' records were used. For persons sentenced at the local level (un-
der a year), records were scattered across the state in county jails and
probation officers' files.
The commission eventually ranked felonies into fourteen seri-
ousness levels and devised a scoring system for criminal history that
assigned variable weights based on the number of convictions, their se-
riousness, the similarity of the prior conviction to the current offense,
and the length of time between convictions. Ranges were set using the
"typical" crime as the standard; the King County Prosecutor's staff as-
sisted the commission by providing examples of each. Individual cir-
cumstances that fell outside the normal range of conduct were to be
addressed by exceptional sentences. The commission's proposed sen-
tencing grid was a matrix with 140 cells (see fig. 1).
Commission members became forceful proponents of the just de-
serts philosophy; some started with this conviction, and others, partic-
ularly the judges, became convinced over time. The legislature's direc-
tion was clear-the guidelines were to "apply equally to offenders in
all parts of the state, without discrimination as to any element that does
not relate to the crime or the previous record of the defendant" (Wash.
Rev. Code, title 9, chap. 94A, sec. 340 [2001]). This principle signifi-
candy influenced the commission's deliberations and was repeatedly
invoked during discussions.
Judicial discretion within the applicable sentence range was un-
restricted; judges could impose any sentence within the range for any
reason they deemed appropriate, and appellate review was prohibited
(Wash. Rev. Code, tide 9, chap. 94A, sec. 370 [2001]). For less serious
felonies, the range was modest-for serious offenses, it was substantial.
Similarly, decisions to use the first-time offender waiver were immune
from judicial review. Since the legislature had selected a presumptive
sentencing system, the commission needed to set direction on how
cases outside the norm were to be recognized and determine the de-
grees of freedom allowed in setting terms outside the range.
The original legislation defined "exceptional sentences" as war-
ranted when the "imposition of a sentence within the standard range
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would impose an excessive punishment on the defendant or would pose
an unacceptable threat to community safety" (Laws of 1981, chap. 137,
sec. 2 [2]). As the commission worked to implement the reform, mem-
bers studied Minnesota's experience and were impressed with that
state's emerging case law interpreting its exceptional sentence provi-
sion. The commission decided that Minnesota's appellate decisions
would reinforce Washington's reform and assist in creating a "com-
mon law of sentencing," one of the stated legislative intents. The com-
mission thus recommended that the legislature replace the original
language with Minnesota's provision requiring "substantial and com-
pelling" reasons to justify a departure from the applicable guidelines
(Wash. Rev. Code, tide 9, chap. 94A, sec. 120[2] [2001]). The legisla-
ture concurred in 1983, and the early appellate decisions reviewing ex-
ceptional sentences in Washington frequently referred to Minnesota
decisions.
The commission chose to guide judicial discretion by creating a set
of aggravating and mitigating factors that would justify an exceptional
sentence. While careful to state that these factors were "illustrative
only and are not intended to be exclusive reasons for exceptional sen-
tences" (Wash. Rev. Code, tide 9, chap. 94A, sec. 390 [2001]), the
commission reinforced the legislative emphasis on just deserts by se-
lecting only factors relating to the crime. Offender characteristics un-
related to the crime were noticeably absent (Boerner 1985, pp. 2-33).
Washington's commission struggled with whether the guidelines
should be based on the statutory definition of the crime or instead
should more sensitively measure criminal conduct, varying by elements
of the crime or other defined variables (degree of harm to victim, etc.).
The eventual decision that sentences were to be based solely on the
crime of conviction was reinforced by language that "real facts which
establish elements of a higher crime, a more serious crime, or addi-
tional crimes cannot be used to go outside the guidelines except upon
stipulation" (Wash. Rev. Code, title 9, chap. 94A, sec. 370[2] [2001]).
The commission intended to eliminate the former practice of basing
sentences on conduct the offender was believed to have done, regard-
less of whether it was proven or admitted. The commission believed
this policy would reinforce the goal that prosecutors charge and accept
plea agreements that accurately reflected the crime or crimes that were
committed. Crimes that prosecutors either could not or chose not to
pursue could not justify an exceptional sentence.
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A. Prosecutorial Discretion
The 1981 legislation recognized that sentencing guidelines in-
creased the relative power of prosecutors by increasing the importance
of the crime of conviction in determining the ultimate sentence. The
legislature thus directed the commission to "devise recommended
prosecuting standards in respect to charging of offenses and plea
agreements" (Wash. Rev. Code, tide 9, chap. 94A, sec. 040[2][c]
[2001]). To accomplish this, the commission reviewed earlier efforts
of the California District Attorney's Association (1974), the National
District Attorney's Association (1977), and the U.S. Justice Depart-
ment under Attorney General Edward H. Levi (Levi 1978) and Benja-
min R. Civiletti (1980), as well as guidelines adopted by the King
County (Seattle) Prosecuting Attorney's Office (1980) and the Wash-
ington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys (1980).
The commission developed guidelines for charging decisions and
plea agreements. When enacted in 1984 they became the most com-
prehensive set of prosecutorial guidelines ever adopted in the United
States (Wash. Rev. Code, tide 9, chap. 94A, sec. 430-60 [2001];
Boerner 1985, p. 12-1). Crimes against persons and those against prop-
erty were distinguished with regard to the necessary evidentiary
strength for prosecution, with person crimes set at a lower threshold.
A series of nonevidentiary reasons were listed that could support a de-
cision not to prosecute. For the key decisions regarding the number
and nature of charges, the direction was that only "charges which ade-
quately describe the nature of the defendant's conduct" were to be
filed, and prosecutors should "decline to file charges that are not nec-
essary to such an indication" (Wash. Rev. Code, title 9, chap. 94A, sec.
440 [2001]). Prosecutors were directed not to "overcharge" to obtain
a guilty plea; defendants were normally expected to plead guilty to the
charge or charges which "adequately describe the nature of his or her
conduct" (Wash. Rev. Code, title 9, chap. 94A, sec. 440 [2001]) or go
to trial unless one of eight specified situations was present to justify
concessions in return for a guilty plea.
The legislation included an enforcement mechanism. When plea
agreements were reached, the "nature of the agreement and the rea-
sons" were to be disclosed to the court, and the court "shall determine
if the agreement is consistent with the interests of justice and the pros-
ecuting standards" (Wash. Rev. Code, tide 9, chap. 94A, sec. 090
[2001]). Once the guidelines were approved by the commission, the
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key policy decision was whether they were advisory or mandatory.
Here, the commission adopted language based on Attorney General
Levi's memorandum on federal prosecution standards (Levi 1978;
Boerner 1985, p. 12-8): "These standards are intended solely for the
guidance of prosecutors in the state of Washington. They are not in-
tended to, do not and may not be relied upon to create a right or bene-
fit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party in litigation
with the state" (Wash. Rev. Code, title 9, chap. 94A, sec. 430 [2001]).
This provision made the prosecutorial guidelines voluntary. Ulti-
mately, they were to join previous voluntary efforts by the state's pa-
role board and judiciary as ineffective efforts to constrain discretion.
B. Retroactivity and Intermediate Sanctions
Guided by what it saw as the difficulty of applying the new guide-
lines to sentences imposed under the former indeterminate system, the
1981 legislature anticipated prospective application of the guidelines
(applied to persons committing crimes on or after July 1, 1984). The
parole board was directed to use the guidelines as a benchmark, thus
anticipating that the board would operate for some period. Some draft-
ers of the reform anticipated that the board's responsibilities would
eventually be taken over by a newly created body, the Clemency and
Pardons Board (Lasnik 1981, p. 7).
When the commission considered the paths taken by California and
Minnesota in converting from indeterminate to determinate sentences,
the two systems' differential premiums on accurate charges was of
great concern. Since the conversion could apply constitutionally only
when it benefited offenders, sentences would be reduced, in many
cases, quite significantly. This choice had few political supporters.
The commission chose to recommend that the 1981 legislative di-
rection to the parole board be supplemented with additional language.
The original language directed the board to "consider the purposes,
standards and sentencing ranges" of the Sentencing Reform Act and
attempt to make decisions that were "reasonably consistent" (Wash.
Rev. Code, tide 9, chap. 95, sec. 009[2] [2001]). New language was
added that the board should also "consider the different charging and
disposition practices under the indeterminate sentencing system" and
justify sentences outside the range with written reasons (Wash. Rev.
Code, title 9, chap. 95, sec. 009[2] [2001]). Washington's transition be-
tween systems continues to this day, with a part-time, three-member
board remaining to review the terms and releases of approximately
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1,000 inmates still in 1999 subject to sentences for pre-July 1, 1984
crimes (Marsh 1999). Other solutions have been considered, but con-
cerns about sentence reductions and implementation burdens have
trumped other options. (See Office of Financial Management 1997 and
Indeterminate Sentence Review Board 1989.)
The commission spent many hours discussing the legislature's direc-
tive that alternatives to total confinement be emphasized for nonvio-
lent crimes. Ultimately, a conversion method was selected: all sen-
tences under one year could be converted to partial confinement
(confinement "for a substantial portion of each day with the balance
spent in the community"), and up to thirty days of total confinement
could be converted to community service at a rate of one day to eight
hours (Wash. Rev. Code, title 9, chap. 94A, sec. 380 [2001]). The com-
mission considered day fines but could not reach consensus on this rec-
ommendation. Bringing the conversion alternatives to the court's at-
tention, the commission recommended that courts be required to
indicate in the sentencing why alternative sanctions were not ordered.
This was proposed as a way to learn how the courts viewed alternative
sanctions in individual cases and if availability of alternatives in individ-
ual counties influenced judges' decisions. (Unfortunately, this require-
ment is viewed by practitioners and judges as unnecessary and has
never been effective in influencing discretion.) These modest alterna-
tives were to be all that were developed. The currency of punishment
in Washington was to be confinement, and that judgment was not to
change.
C. Population Forecast Shows Sufficient Capacity
By late fall 1983, the commission had a proposed set of guidelines,
and its research database was complete, thus allowing the first projec-
tions of population impact. Commission members held their breath.
The research director announced that the proposed guidelines were
reconcilable in projected operation with prison capacity and would, by
1996, decrease the prison population by more than 40 percent to 4,076
(Lange 1982). For jails, the guidelines overall could be implemented
within the allocated capacity for felons as long as alternatives to con-
finement were created (Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1983,
p. 42).
For some, the projections seemed too good to be true. Washington
had seen prison forecasts in the past "fine tuned" to support various
political positions. The governor was the first to challenge the com-
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mission's work, telling the news media the forecast represented "blue
sky figures" (Tacoma News Tribune 1983). The executive branch was
worried that the legislature might cancel funding for a planned 500-
bed prison. Corrections officials suggested that guidelines would, in
fact, increase prison crowding and require even more prison beds than
were needed under indeterminate sentencing (Spokane Chronicle 1983).
The corrections secretary declared that "there's nothing scientific"
about the forecast (Lange 1982).
From the other side, a citizen's group argued that the state should
immediately cancel its plans for a new 500-bed prison. The commis-
sion advanced a more moderate option: continue with the planned new
prison, but shelve additional prison construction plans. Here, the com-
mission members' individual credibility was critical, in particular
Norm Maleng's. Maleng was known as a prosecutor who would not
compromise public safety-in this case, represented by adequate
prison space. For Olympia insiders, the reputation of the research di-
rector, David Fallen, increased confidence in the prison space projec-
tions. Fallen was known to be an exceptional researcher who would
never bend science for politics.
In the late fall of 1983, the commission reviewed the draft guidelines
and, with the prison forecast showing some room for increases in sen-
tence severity, adjusted some penalties upward. The range for second-
degree burglary was increased, as the commission members knew that
this felony affected more citizens than any other crime and was not
experienced merely as a loss of property but as a personal threat.
The commission appeared before the 1983 legislature with a set of
recommendations that could be implemented within existing resources
and had been adopted unanimously. Commission leaders came to
Olympia on numerous occasions, testifying before committees and
meeting informally with the party caucuses. Panels of commission
members met with editorial boards throughout the state. Norm Ma-
leng played an active role in legislative negotiations. At a late point in
the session, the proposed policy for multiple serious offenses came un-
der scrutiny. Robert Lasnik understood that dissatisfaction with the
guidelines on these serious cases could threaten the reform's political
viability. He proposed consecutive sentencing for offenders with three
or more serious violent offenses, and this amendment was accepted by
commission representatives and the bill's sponsors. In April 1983,
when the commission's guideline bill was passed, Washington joined
the small but growing list of sentencing guidelines states.
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D. Implementation
Commission leaders understood that implementation was their next
challenge. Major system changes are especially vulnerable to political
challenge during their early stages, when the cost of returning to the
"old ways" is relatively modest. The commission's first task was to or-
ganize the law's complexities into a user-friendly publication. The
commission created an implementation manual with individualized
sentencing sheets for every major felony. By consulting one sheet,
practitioners could identify the applicable scoring rules for criminal
history, the sentencing range, and the available sentencing options for
each case. This approach resolved concerns about the system's com-
plexities.
Following the advice of staff and members of Minnesota's commis-
sion, the commission initiated a proactive media relations campaign
(Parent 1988, pp. 136-46). Members met with reporters and editorial
boards throughout the state to explain the act, its rationale, and the
care with which it had been implemented.
Judicial opposition remained but was significantly moderated by the
leadership of the four judges on the commission, all of whom were
highly regarded by their peers. While initially skeptical about the wis-
dom of the Sentencing Reform Act, these judges worked hard to im-
plement the legislature's intent; their support was a significant factor
in the act's successful implementation.
Opposition among correctional officials, both state leaders and line
staff, remained deep-seated. The reform's proponents believed that
shifting from coerced to voluntary rehabilitation was an opportunity to
refocus from surveillance to service delivery. The legislature did not
increase funding for this purpose, however, and corrections officials
did not redirect the state's organizational focus. When commission
staff or members spoke to correctional groups and referred to the leg-
islative intent that parolees receive voluntary services, the audiences
broke into laughter. The law's emphasis on rehabilitation for first-
time, nonviolent offenders was never enthusiastically implemented by
the corrections department. Because many offenders in this group
were considered at low risk to reoffend, services to this population ap-
peared to many officers as superfluous. Instead, staff concentrated on
enforcement of court orders.
In 1984, the department of corrections convinced the legislature that
the reform's original provision that all prisoners exit prison through
work release was unrealistic. Given that some offenders were poor
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public safety risks, work release instead became optional (Wash. Rev.
Code, title 9, chap. 94A, sec. 150[5] [2001]). In later years, the depart-
ment repeatedly returned to the legislature, seeking "reform" of the
Sentencing Reform Act.
The commission encountered significant challenges in setting sen-
tences for sex crimes, and it concentrated on this issue during the year
between legislative adoption of the guidelines in 1983 and the next leg-
islative session. Victim advocates argued that presumptive prison sen-
tences for intrafamily crimes would be viewed as too harsh by the fam-
ily and would discourage prosecution, and thus they favored an option
combining supervision and outpatient treatment. Treatment providers
pointed to the compulsive nature of these crimes and argued that with-
out treatment, sex offenders would likely continue to reoffend after re-
lease (Lieb and Matson 1997, p. 85).
The commission's resolution exemplified the pragmatism that has
characterized sentencing reform in Washington. Working with victim
advocates and offender treatment providers, the commission crafted a
sentencing option that permitted treatment for sex offenders without
prior sex convictions (except those convicted of forcible rape). This
"special sexual offender sentencing alternative" included a suspended
prison sentence, the only instance in which this centerpiece of the for-
mer indeterminate system was authorized (Wash. Rev. Code, title 9,
chap. 94A, sec. 12018] [2001]). This sentencing option, along with
more detailed sentencing guidelines for drug offenses, was adopted by
the 1984 legislature. Thus, as with the first-time offender provisions
in the original act, when state policy makers saw the need, Washing-
ton's reform employed the indeterminate system's mechanisms of co-
erced rehabilitation.
On the eve of implementation, Washington's guidelines received
significant statewide and national attention. A columnist in the Wash-
ington Post noted that "those of us who have been calling for the re-
form and rationalization of criminal sentencing should just shut up for
a while and watch Washington State. Virtually everything the reform-
ers have been demanding is in the new law" (Raspberry 1984).
E. Prison Population
While implementation of the law went smoothly, the consequences
for the prison population was dramatic. By 1985, the percent of violent
offenders receiving state prison sentences had increased to 65 percent
from the 1982 rate of 49 percent, while nonviolent offenders sent to
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prison declined from 13 percent to 9 percent (Fallen 1986, p. ix). Since
86 percent of all convictions were for nonviolent offenses, this shift
reduced the state's overall imprisonment rate from 20 percent in 1982
to 17 percent in 1988 and significantly reduced prison commitments
(Fallen 1986, p. 5).
At the same time, parole board releases of prisoners accelerated ow-
ing to court rulings in 1986. Prisoners successfully argued that the
board was ignoring the legislative mandate that they consider sentenc-
ing guidelines in setting release dates, and the court's rulings required
the board to reconsider its previous decisions (In re Myers, 105 Wn. 2d
257 [Wash. 1986] and Addleman v. Board of Prison Terms and Paroles,
107 Wn. 2d 503 [Wash. 1986]). By 1986, the Office of Financial Man-
agement estimated that the act had reduced prison inmates by 1,074
(15 percent of the total population) (Fallen 1986, p. 35). This was re-
markably close to the commission's 1983 forecast.
Imprisonment rates began to drop. From 156 per 100,000 popula-
tion in 1984, the rate decreased to 147 in 1986 and reached a low of
124 in 1988, a decrease of 20 percent during a period in which the
national average increased by 30 percent, from 188 per 100,000 in
1984 to 244 in 1988. Washington dropped from twenty-fifth in the
nation in imprisonment rates in 1984 to thirty-ninth in 1988 (Bureau
of Justice Statistics 1998, p. 491).
Washington had the luxury of excess capacity. From 1987 to 1989,
the state ran a "rent-a-cell" program with the federal government and
other states; approximately 1,000 beds were rented. In this atmosphere,
even though the excess capacity was generally known to be short-term,
the legislature began to adopt a different attitude. With empty prison
beds, the legislative debate on crime and the need to toughen sentences
was not tempered by concerns about prison crowding.
Many local government representatives argued that the state had
solved its crowding problem by shifting felons to local jails, whose
funding was a local responsibility. The commission's research revealed
that 20 percent of statewide jail space was dedicated to felons prior to
the reform; the majority of jail beds were occupied by misdemeanants.
For the first years after the reform, this distribution pattern for the
state as a whole remained constant, although the effects varied for indi-
vidual jails depending on whether they were above or below the state
average in sending nonviolent offenders to prison. This research did
not convince most local officials, however, nor were they persuaded
when the commission found that jail population increases after the re-
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form were primarily influenced by increases in misdemeanor convic-
tions (Bell and Fallen 1990, p. ii). In this political atmosphere, legisla-
tive proposals for more severe sentences satisfied two political goals:
getting tough on criminals and moving felons from local jails and bud-
gets to state prisons.
F. The Courts Respond
There was a high degree of judicial compliance. In 1985, judges
went outside the guidelines in only 3.5 percent of cases. Because the
law allowed judicial discretion in the form of sentencing options for
first-time and sex offenders, this statistic did not fully describe the ex-
ercise of discretion. By combining the decisions involving sentencing
options with departure cases, the rate of sentences outside the pre-
sumptive range rose to almost 30 percent (Fallen 1986, p. 23). County-
to-county variances in sentencing practices were significantly reduced
(Fallen 1986, p. 16).
During the legislative debate on the act, critics argued that the
state's trial rate would increase dramatically, since defendants no
longer had an incentive to plead guilty. This prediction was not real-
ized: the percentage of guilty pleas remained exactly the same in 1985
(90.1 percent) as it had been in 1982. The only changes were a slight
decease in jury trials (7.8 percent in 1982, 6.7 percent in 1985) and a
slight increase in bench trials (2.1 percent in 1982, 2.8 percent in 1995;
Fallen 1986, p. 39; Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1995, p. 18).
G. Charging Practices
With sentencing guidelines, the crime of conviction became far
more significant in determining the sentence. Soon after the reform's
implementation, conviction patterns shifted (Fallen 1986; see table 1).
For eight of the nine seriousness levels calling for presumptive
prison sentences, conviction rates were reduced postreform, support-
ing the thesis that prosecutors were exercising their discretion to re-
duce charges. Convictions of offenses with presumptive jail terms,
however, reflect a mixed pattern more consistent with the typical varia-
tion from year to year. The changes for unranked crime patterns were
notable. This category was created for low-frequency crimes whose
widely varying nature justified greater judicial discretion. Since un-
ranked crimes have a presumptive sentence range of zero to twelve
months, a change of convictions from ranked seriousness levels to this
unranked category significantly expanded judicial discretion. Over
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TABLE 1
Changes in State Conviction Patterns (in Percent)
Fiscal Year Calendar Year
Seriousness Level 1982 1985 Difference
Prison sentence:
XIV .2 .1 -. 1
XIII .5 .3 -. 2
XII .3 .4 +A
XI .1 .2 -. 1
X .9 .5 -. 4
IX 5.6 3.5 -2.1
VIII 1.4 .9 -. 5
VII 3.4 2.1 -1.3
VI 4.7 5.7 -1.0
Jail sentence:
V .8 .9 +.1
IV 10.6 9.5 -1.1
Ill 8.3 10.7 +2.4
II 34.5 32.2 -2.3
I 28.7 30.6 +1.9
Unranked 0.0 2.5 +2.5
Total 100.0 100.1
time, this pattern was to become even more pronounced. Prosecutorial
discretion was not only unconstrained but arguably increased in com-
parison to the discretion exercised by other actors in the criminal jus-
tice system (Boerner 1997).
H. The Appellate Courts
The first appellate decisions interpreting the reform were awaited
with great interest. In its first decision in 1985, an appellate court up-
held the act's key principles by reversing an aggravated exceptional
sentence that relied on the explanation that an attempted escape had
involved "sophisticated and well-planned methods" (State v. Baker, 700
P. 2d 1198 [Wash. App. 1985]). Because all attempted escapes involve
planning, the court argued, this argument failed to meet the "substan-
tial and compelling test" (State v. Baker, 700 P. 2d 1198 [Wash.
App. 1985]).
Early decisions also held that factors used in determining the pre-
sumptive range (crime and criminal history) could not be used as a jus-
tification for an exceptional sentence (State v. Hartley, 705 P. 2d 821
[Wash. App. 1985]) and that uncharged conduct could not justify an
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exceptional sentence (State v. Harp, 717 P. 2d 282 [Wash. App. 1986]).
In 1986, the Washington Supreme Court unanimously declared the
Sentencing Reform Act constitutional, stating that "the trial court's
discretion in sentencing is that which is given by the Legislature"
(State v. Ammons, 718 P. 2d 796 [Wash. App. 1986]). "The legislative
wisdom of the Sentencing Reform Act," said the court of appeals, "is
not the subject for judicial review" (State v. Fisher, 715 P. 2d 530
[Wash. App. 1986]).
By 1986 implementation was complete and the Sentencing Reform
Act was an accepted feature of the criminal justice landscape. The re-
form was widely acknowledged as effective in accomplishing its objec-
tives, even by those who did not share those objectives.
IH. The Return of the Legislature, 1986-92
The legislature, which accepted the recommendations of the sentenc-
ing commission in every instance from 1983 to 1986, in 1987 began
to reassert its primacy. The leaders of the coalition that produced the
Sentencing Reform Act in 1981 had left the legislature by this time,
and new perspectives became influential. Two issues were prominent:
reassessment of sentence lengths for some crimes and reconsideration
of postrelease supervision. Washington's experience would prove the
prescience of Zimring's assertion that "it takes no more than an
eraser" to change sentence lengths in a determinate sentencing system
(Zimring 1977, p. 13).
A. Increased Sentence Length
The first change was symbolically important, although it affected
few cases. In 1985, the Washington Cattleman's Association ap-
proached the commission regarding the sentence range for theft of
livestock, "rustling" in the vernacular. The commission had set the
presumptive sentence range at Seriousness Level II, the same as Theft
in the First Degree (over $1,500). The cattlemen believed this ranking,
which called for a presumptive sentence of zero-to-ninety days for first
offenders, was a grossly inadequate response to sophisticated armed
"rustlers." The commission's initial response was that exceptional sen-
tences could handle these cases, and, thus, no statutory changes were
necessary. The cattlemen were not appeased and the debate took on a
rural versus urban tension, with the cattlemen arguing that most com-
mission representatives lived in cities and were therefore insensitive to
the realities and dangers of rural life.
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The commission spent considerable time determining how to re-
spond to the cattlemen without violating the proportionality of the
guidelines. Ultimately, the group proposed two degrees of theft of live-
stock-first degree for theft with the intent to sell and second degree
for theft for personal use. Presumptive sentence ranges were increased
to three-to-nine months for first degree and one-to-three months for
second degree (Wash. Rev. Code, title 9A, chap. 56, sec. 080 [2001]).
The impact was small (an average of two convictions per year), but the
resolution troubled some commission members who believed the body
had sacrificed its principles to political expediency.
1. Drug Offenses. Political attention turned in late 1985 toward the
harm caused by crack cocaine in particular, and by drug dealers in gen-
eral. The initial sentence range for delivery of Schedule 1 drugs (her-
oin, cocaine, and other similar drugs) called for first-time offenders to
receive a prison sentence (twelve to fourteen months); the first-time
offender waiver allowed a zero-to-ninety-day period of confinement
plus a year of supervision. By 1986, commission data showed that many
offenders convicted of these crimes were receiving the waiver and
avoiding a prison sentence. Norm Maleng led an effort to eliminate
this sentencing option for such crimes. He consistently took the posi-
tion that those who "deal" drugs deserve prison and saw the extensive
use of the first-time offender waiver as inconsistent with this goal. It
appeared that this adjustment would satisfy the political appetite for
increased sentence severity, maintain proportionality within the sen-
tencing grid, and simultaneously reinforce the reform's political viabil-
ity by adjusting to changed views of crime seriousness.
Not everyone on the commission agreed with Maleng's argument,
but all respected his political skills and understood the likely popularity
of his position with the legislature. He informed the commission that
the prosecutors intended to propose this amendment, but the commis-
sion did not formally consider the matter and did not testify. The pro-
posal was adopted by a strong bipartisan majority and took effect in
1987.
The commission's decision to abstain on this issue was, at least to
some observers, motivated by a desire to maintain the group's political
cohesion and maintain credibility with the legislature. Given the de-
parture of the reform's original legislative proponents, some commis-
sion members worried that taking politically unpopular positions
would weaken the body's influence in future sentencing debates. As
noted by Wright (1998, p. 458), commissions have limited political
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capital and must select their political battles. In our opinion, the com-
mission accurately assessed its political position; abstaining, however,
did not protect the commission's declining political influence.
Concerns about drug offenses did not subside. By 1988, the commis-
sion's prosecutors convinced the group to revisit the sentencing ranges
for these crimes. The commission recommended that the 1989 legisla-
ture increase the seriousness levels (and thus, the presumptive sentence
length) for certain drug offenses. Its recommendation was incorpo-
rated into an omnibus bill developed and supported by a bipartisan
group of legislators. When the legislation passed in 1989, the pre-
sumptive sentence ranges for first-offense delivery of drugs increased
from 12-14 months to 21-27 months, the offender score points for
prior drug convictions were increased, and a twenty-four-month en-
hancement was added for deliveries occurring within 1,000 feet of a
school or a school bus stop or in a public park.
With some penalty increases, the impact on state prison populations
is delayed because the increased confinement times show up in the fu-
ture. In this instance, however, an increased volume of drug convic-
tions occurred in the state at the same time as the penalty change, thus
multiplying the population consequences. In combination with the im-
pact of an average one-year sentence for drug deliveries becoming a
two-year sentence, the results were dramatic. The number of convic-
tions for drug offenses doubled between 1985 and 1987 and then dou-
bled again between 1987 and 1989. Prison admissions for drug offenses
increased from 143 in 1986 to 1,139 in 1989. By 1990, they reached
1,565 and constituted 37 percent of all prison admissions (Washington
State Department of Corrections 1996, p. 3).
2. Sex Offenses. In 1986, the commission established a subcommit-
tee to reconsider penalties and criminal code definitions for sex of-
fenses. Under the indeterminate system, the wide-ranging discretion
of judges and the parole board had been used to adjust penalties to
individual circumstances. With determinate sentencing, the criminal
code definitions became more critical. The King County Prosecutor's
Office had a special assault unit that aggressively prosecuted sex of-
fenses. The unit chief convinced the subcommittee that changes to the
criminal code and penalties were necessary, given the harm caused to
victims. The commission endorsed the subcommittee's proposed
changes. The commission's 1987 legislative proposal was passed in one
house but later stalled because of concerns about the need for more
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prison beds to accommodate the increased number of prisoners. In
1988, the commission's recommendations were slightly revised and in-
troduced by the legislator who had blocked passage the previous year.
This legislation passed without controversy.
In 1989, the legislature again revisited sentencing laws for sex of-
fenders. The kidnapping and mutilation of a child by a released sex
offender became a topic of intense public attention, causing the gover-
nor to establish a special Task Force on Community Protection. The
task force, which included sentencing commission members and was
chaired by Norm Maleng, reviewed the state's criminal and mental
health laws to determine policy options. The offender involved in the
controversial child kidnapping had been released from prison after
serving his maximum sentence. His declared intent, before release, to
harm children greatly concerned corrections officials, but the threats
were considered neither immediate enough to warrant a mental health
commitment nor specific enough to warrant criminal prosecution.
The political environment demanded a solution for dangerous of-
fenders about to be released from prison, as well as for sex offenders
who would be sentenced in the future. The task force presented a
package of proposals to the 1990 legislature, including increases in the
presumptive sentence range for sex crimes, reduction of time off for
good behavior, and a narrowly focused authorization for indefinite civil
commitment for sexually violent predators who completed their prison
sentences. Washington's attorney general proposed legislation to enact
indeterminate life sentences for all serious violent offenses but did not
invest any political capital in promoting his proposal. Task force lead-
ers argued that a return to indeterminate sentencing would leave the
state in a powerless position for offenders previously sentenced who
exited prison with clear intent to harm and was thus only a partial rem-
edy. The history of the task force's deliberations is detailed in a previ-
ous essay (Boerner 1992). The task force's recommendations were
unanimously adopted by the legislature in 1990.
Despite these changes, the provisions allowing treatment in the
community for sex offenders remained intact. As sentence lengths in-
creased, the eligibility criteria were adjusted so that offenders previ-
ously eligible would continue to be eligible. This option retained the
strong political support of the victim community, who successfully ar-
gued that its availability was essential for successful prosecution of in-
trafamily sexual abuse.
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B. Postrelease Supervision
Washington's 1981 reform legislation abolished both parole and
probation. Offenders who completed prison terms were to be released;
in instances where work release was a reasonable public safety risk, of-
fenders were to spend time in work release as a transition phase, then
exit the system. Three central arguments justified this policy change.
First, supervision by parole officers was said not to be helpful in reduc-
ing reoffending, but it gave corrections staff extensive discretion to set
conditions and impose punishment on selected offenders, with little
oversight. Second, parolees were eligible for voluntary services to assist
their readjustment. Third, the state must limit its promises to citizens
to those that are achievable and realistic. Ex-offenders decide whether
to commit new crimes, and the state has relatively little influence on
these decisions. The drafters believed that the effectiveness of supervi-
sion over released offenders was modest, at best, and highly unlikely
to deter crime.
Judges could impose "community supervision" for up to one year,
but the authority of courts to order affirmative conditions, such as par-
ticipation in treatment or school, was severely restricted under the re-
form. The act authorized only "crime-related prohibitions" (Wash.
Rev. Code, title 9, chap. 94A, sec. 030[11] [2001]) and "other sentence
conditions authorized by the Act" as conditions of sentence, except
with first-time offenders and certain sex offenders. For all other
crimes, judges were authorized to impose a one-year term of "commu-
nity supervision" during which the offender was "subject to crime-
related prohibitions and other sentence conditions imposed pursuant"
to the act (Wash. Rev. Code, title 9, chap. 94A, sec. 030[8] [2001]).
Since those conditions did not include affirmative conduct or the obli-
gation not to commit new crimes, the authority of corrections officers
to seek sanctions for violations was substantially reduced. The intent
was to replace the "former system of coerced rehabilitation with a sys-
tem of facilitative rehabilitation" that was "offered but not compelled"
(Boerner 1985, pp. 4-6). New crimes were to be prosecuted and
charged.
1. Correctional Officers. It is not surprising that corrections officials
did not share the reformers' views about parole. In 1986, Chase Rive-
land became secretary of the department of corrections, having previ-
ously served as a correctional administrator in Wisconsin and Colo-
rado. Riveland argued that the act seriously restricted correctional
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officers' ability to protect the public and left officers powerless as they
observed released offenders headed toward criminal acts.
In 1986, a prominent state senator indicated interest in sponsoring
a bill that resurrected postrelease supervision. Members of the com-
mission met with him to explain the reformers' rationale for eliminat-
ing parole and to try to persuade him to drop the bill. The senator
informed the commission that postrelease supervision was essential to
public safety and that his judgment on state policy was more in tune
with citizens' views than the commission's judgment.
The senator sponsored legislation to reinstate postrelease supervi-
sion, which did not pass. He then spearheaded a citizen's initiative
drive. The measure did not gather sufficient signatures to appear on
the ballot. Following the meeting with the commission, the senator
worked assiduously to restrict the body's capacity and political credibil-
ity. He proposed numerous amendments to reduce the agency's op-
erating budget, to limit the staff director to a half-time position, and
to alter the body's authority. Although the amendments were often
withdrawn before a vote, they sent a clear message of disapproval of
the agency and of the senator's perception of the commission's arro-
gance.
2. Amending the Act. The senator and the department of correc-
tions crafted a bill for the 1987 session to reauthorize postrelease su-
pervision. The commission realized that opposing the bill altogether
was unlikely to stop it, so commission representatives negotiated with
the department of corrections to make the proposal as consistent as
possible with the act. The result was a bill authorizing a one-year pe-
riod of postrelease supervision for offenders convicted of serious
crimes (offenses committed while armed, sex offenses, and drug of-
fenses). The legislation passed in 1988, with expanded discretion for
courts to order offenders to work, not to use or possess controlled sub-
stances, and to attend "crime-related treatment or counseling services"
(Wash. Rev. Code, title 9, chap. 94A, sec. 120[8] [2001]).
Commission representatives successfully persuaded legislators that
requiring offenders to "obey all laws" during this period of supervision
was unwise, because prosecutors would lose some incentive to pursue
new convictions, knowing that the behavior also qualified as a violation
of sentence conditions and therefore the system could far more easily
impose punishment under that label. A relatively complex scheme of
supervision was developed that differentiated between offenders who
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did and did not earn good time; those released early because of good
time were under administrative rather than court authority.
Thus, once again, Washington's sentencing policies were pragmati-
cally recast. Supervision after release was authorized, but selectively (a
third of prison releases initially, rising to 68 percent by 2000), with
sanctions for violations limited to the unserved portion of the original
sentence (good time could reduce the period of incarceration by up
to one-third) or sixty days per violation. The amendments granted no
authority to reduce sentence lengths or conditions.
C. Prison Population and Sentence Lengths
By 1992, felony convictions had increased to 18,067, an increase of
127 percent from 7,953 in 1985. Average sentence lengths returned to
1985 levels, with an average prison sentence length of 44 months in
1992 (43.91 months in 1985) and an average jail sentence length of 2.8
months (2.55 months in 1985). The imprisonment rate, which had
fallen to 124 per 100,000 population in 1988, began to climb, reaching
192 in 1992. This represented a 23 percent increase over the rate of
156 in 1983, the last preguideline year. This rate of growth, however,
was far lower than the national increase of 75 percent from 188 to 330
per 100,000 population in the same period. Prison population contin-
ued to increase, reaching 9,930 in 1992 (Sentencing Guidelines Com-
mission 1992b, p. iii; Bureau of Justice Statistics 1998, p. 491).
The guidelines' initial success in reducing the prison population
provided a climate that enabled the legislature to revisit sentence
lengths set in 1984. Significantly, while each change increased sentence
length, each change used the guidelines to target particular crimes.
This pattern has held; unlike Minnesota and other states (Frase 1993,
p. 293), Washington has not had an across-the-board increase-or de-
crease-in sentence lengths.
IV. The Populist Era, 1992-95
Washington's political system reflects its populist origins. The first
provision of the state constitution declares that "All political power is
inherent in the people" (Washington Constitution, art. 1, sec. 1). The
"people's power" has been jealously guarded and frequently exercised.
In 1993 and again in 1995, the people of Washington exercised their
"inherent" power to bring back mandatory sentences for certain of-
fenders.
The nation's first "three strikes and you're out" law appeared as an
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initiative in Washington, along with a second initiative related to fel-
onies committed with a firearm. The 1981 Sentencing Reform Act had
repealed Washington's previous broad mandatory minimum provisions
and also its habitual criminal act, leaving only three mandatory mini-
mum terms-murder in the first degree (not less than twenty years),
assault in the first degree (not less than five years), and rape in the first
degree (not less than three years) (Wash. Rev. Code, title 9, chap. 94A,
sec. 120[4] [2001]).
A. Three Strikes
Mandatory sentences retained their political popularity in Washing-
ton. In 1992, a bill was introduced providing for mandatory life sen-
tences-with release possible only upon a gubernatorial pardon or
commutation-following the third conviction of a "most serious of-
fense," which included most crimes of violence. Many leaders in the
criminal justice system opposed the proposal; few, however, expressed
their opinions openly. Elected officials judged the measure's political
support as unstoppable (Wright 1998, pp. 451-53). The sentencing
commission offered an alternative, which narrowed the provision's
scope considerably. Both proposals failed when the legislature was un-
able to resolve the differences.
The measure was promoted by a conservative Washington think
tank, which turned next to the initiative process. Any proposition may
be placed on the ballot with sufficient voter signatures (8 percent of
the previous general election's voters). Initiatives are common in
Washington, as in most western states-in 1993, for example, voters
also adopted measures concerning term limits and freedom of repro-
ductive choice. The "three strikes" initiative easily qualified for the
1992 ballot and passed with over 75 percent of the state vote, carrying
each of Washington's thirty-nine counties (Boerner 1997, p. 31).
Washington's "three strikes" law is -narrower than those subse-
quently passed in many other states. It imposes a mandatory life sen-
tence, without reduction by good time or parole, on the third separate
conviction of a designated group of "most serious offenses" including
homicide, serious assaults, most sex offenses, robbery, any crime com-
mitted with a deadly weapon, and repeat drug offenses (Wash. Rev.
Code, title 9, chap. 94A, sec. 120[4] [2001]). Because each conviction
must meet this criterion, its scope is narrowed considerably. By con-
trast, Washington's former habitual criminal law applied on the third
conviction of any felony.
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When the law was passed, state forecasters estimated that it would af-
fect eighty offenders a year. The prison population increases would not
appear immediately, however, because such offenders were already sub-
ject to long prison terms. The state estimated prison population increases
of 134 in 2000, 407 in 2005, and 673 in 2010 (Boerner 1997, p. 31).
These estimates, in fact, proved to be quite high. Convictions have
averaged 30 per year (1995 = 36, 1996 = 33, 1997 = 32, 1998 = 25,
1999 = 23, 2000 = 31; Sentencing Guidelines Commission 2000b). The
average age at conviction was thirty-eight; robbery was the most frequent
"third strike" conviction (50 percent), followed by assault (20 percent),
and rape (10 percent) (Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1999a).
B. "Hard Time for Armed Crime"
Encouraged by the success of "three strikes," the same initiative
sponsors returned to the legislature in 1994 with an initiative concern-
ing weapon use in crimes. Tided "Hard Time for Armed Crime," this
initiative proposed a two-tiered system of mandatory prison sentence
enhancements for felons committing crimes while armed with a deadly
weapon. Those armed with a weapon other than a firearm would re-
ceive a basic enhancement of six to twenty-four months, depending on
the class of felony. For crimes involving firearms, the enhancements
would range from eighteen to sixty months. For repeat offenses, en-
hancements would be doubled. All enhancements were consecutive and
to be served without time reductions for good behavior. Sentence
ranges for three firearm-related crimes would be increased (reckless
endangerment, theft of a firearm, and unlawful possession of a fire-
arm). First-degree burglary would be broadened to include crimes in
any building, not just residences.
The initiative also made criminal justice decisions more public.
Prosecutors were required to make public their reasons for plea bar-
gains, and the sentencing commission was required to publish sen-
tences imposed by individual judges.
The projected impact of the "hard time" initiative was far greater
than the impact of "three strikes." The sentencing commission esti-
mated population increases of 209 in the first year, 810 by the fifth
year, and 1,145 by the tenth year. The capital and operating expendi-
ture requirements were estimated at $64 million the first biennium,
$57 million the second, $68 million the third, $50 million the fourth,
and $55 million the fifth-a total increase of $294 million over the first
decade (Boerner 1997, p. 33).
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Washington law allows the legislature two choices when initiatives
gain the necessary signatures: adopt the initiative as proposed, or adopt
an alternative and place both the initiative and the legislative alterna-
tive on the ballot. Legislative leaders believed a more moderate alter-
native would be defeated, and none was proposed. With the memory
of the people's overwhelming vote on "three strikes" in mind, by
strong bipartisan majorities, the legislature adopted the initiative (Van
Wagenen 2001, p. 6).
C. Publication of Judges' Sentencing Decisions
The initiative's direction to the sentencing commission regarding
judicial sentencing patterns was very specific. The initiative required
that the commission record each judge's sentences for all violent
crimes and those involving deadly weapons. When the commission had
set up its original database, the group decided not to record judges'
names with each sentence. The judicial members successfully argued
that such information could be used to unduly pressure judges who
were, after all, operating within discretion granted by the legislature.
Since there was no requirement for judge-specific data in the original
act, this decision had been uncontroversial, both inside the commission
and outside.
The commission first responded to the legislative direction by pub-
lishing the total number of standard range sentences imposed by indi-
vidual judges, with detailed information on each exceptional sentence
(Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1996). The initiative's chief pro-
ponents objected strongly, both to the limitations of the information
and to its timing, since it was released after the election cycle. Subse-
quent reports covered each judge's felony sentences, and publication
was advanced to September of each year.
Up to this point, commission publications and data on judicial sen-
tencing patterns have not been the focus of a judicial election cam-
paign. The evidence as to whether judges' decision making has been
influenced is more ambiguous. The overall rate of exceptional sen-
tences has increased slightly since the reporting requirement was
adopted, but the percentage of mitigated departures steadily declined
until recently (Sentencing Guidelines Commission 2000a; see fig. 2).
The initiative's requirement that prosecutors make their reasons for
plea bargains public has had no discernible effect. No organized system
exists for recording plea bargaining reasons, and judges do not rou-
tinely require prosecutors to indicate why they enter into bargains.
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FIG. 2.-Rate of mitigated departures has declined since adoption of reporting re-
quirement.
The sentencing commission' s report on judicial sentencing indicates
whether the prosecutor agreed with or opposed an exceptional sen-
tence. The nonimplementation of this initiative provision has not at-
tracted criticism. For the initiative sponsors at least, concerns about
leniency toward criminals was focused on judges, not prosecutors. Al-
though complaints that judges are "soft on crime" are not uncommon,
such criticisms are seldom lodged against prosecutors. Prosecutors are
far more likely to be seen as allies in a "get tough" movement (Boerner
1995, p. 198).
Although Washington's citizen initiatives have substantially influ-
enced state sentencing policy, their impact pales in comparison with
Oregon's experience. In that state, initiatives directed toward sentenc-
ing-related topics have been frequent. Initiatives have become the pri-
mary force in Oregon sentencing policy, easily eclipsing the state's
sentencing guidelines (Rosenblum 1995, p. 177; Greene 1997, p. 3).
Felony convictions continued to increase during this period, reach-
ing 20,619 in 1995, a 14.1 percent increase over 1992. The average
prison sentence length increased to 47.5 months (an 8.2 percent in-
crease over 1992), while the average jail sentence length dropped
slightly (from 2.8 months in 1992 to 2.7 months in 1995). The impris-
onment rate increased by 10 percent, from 192 per 100,000 in 1992 to212 per 100,000 in 1995, once again significantly lower than the 25.6
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percent increase nationwide from 330 per 100,000 in 1992 to 411 per
100,000 in 1995. Prison population continued to increase, reaching
11,440 (Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1995, p. 10; Bureau of
Justice Statistics 1998, p. 491).
V. The Revival of Reform, 1995-2000
The "reform" of the 1981 act has not been limited to changes origi-
nated by citizens. Beginning in 1993, the legislature adopted amend-
ments that primarily have increased officials' discretion and authorized
sentences that are arguably inconsistent with the core principles of the
original act. Three of the changes-boot camp legislation, special pro-
visions (based on drug court rationales) for drug possession offenders,
and increased flexibility for non-state-prison sentences-decreased
sentence severities and increased judicial discretion. One provision in-
creased the role of risk predictions and increased community correc-
tions officials' discretion. A "two-strikes" provision for serious second
sexual offenses increased sentence severity and weakened proportional-
ity protections. Each change, however, employed the structure of the
act, and none repealed any portion of the original act.
A. Boot Camps
In 1993, the legislature endorsed the boot camp concept as a means
to add structure and discipline to offenders' lives in the hopes of im-
proving their productivity after release. Washington's version became
known as a "work ethic camp"; judges could recommend it for those
facing prison terms up to three years. If the offender agreed to partici-
pate and was accepted by the department of corrections, he or she was
credited with three days for each day in the camp, with the balance
served on supervised release. Offenders who failed to complete the
camp, or did not comply with release conditions, would serve the re-
mainder of the original prison sentence.
While the authorizing legislation did not use the terms "probation"
or "parole," the sentence was not determinate. This was the first pro-
vision since adoption of the Special Sex Offender Sentencing Alterna-
tive in 1984 to authorize indeterminate sentences. It also was the first
to reduce penalties.
The program was widely viewed as a desirable option for several
years and reached a daily census of 199 in July 1999. By September of
2000, participation was reduced to 57 offenders because offenders and
judges preferred a drug sentencing option that we describe in the next
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subsection (Washington State Department of Corrections FY2000 and
2001, Table 1-A).
B. Drug Sentences
The second change that reduced sentence severity involved drug
sentences. The 1987 and 1989 increases in drug sentence severity,
combined with a substantial increase in drug convictions, caused drug
offenders in the prison population to increase from 16 percent of the
prison population in 1990 to 25 percent in 1994. The political discus-
sion about drug crimes reflected a growing awareness that heavy reli-
ance on incarceration for these crimes was expensive and did not re-
solve some offenders' underlying problems of drug addiction.
In 1991, the Washington State Department of Corrections proposed
legislation for a Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative. The legislation
was originally supported by the governor as a means to counter the
escalating prison population and respond more appropriately to per-
sons with chemical dependencies. The bill was opposed by many peo-
ple, including prosecutors and members of the sentencing commission,
who were concerned that it violated the principles of determinate sen-
tencing. Ultimately, the governor withdrew the proposal and requested
that the sentencing commission prepare recommendations for the
1992 legislative session that "provide a renewed emphasis on alterna-
tives to total confinement in jail or prison for non-violent offenders,
particularly with respect to strengthening our ability to deal with non-
violent substance abusers whose criminal activity is limited to or caused
by that abuse" (Gardner 1991, p. 2). A commission subcommittee
spent several months considering options and ultimately proposed cre-
ation of a drug offender sentencing option; a separate subcommittee
proposed a nonviolent offender option that included an expanded
range of alternative sanctions (Sentencing Guidelines Commission
1992a, pp. 19-22).
The commission as a whole endorsed the proposals and submitted
them to the 1992 legislature. The legislation was opposed by the pros-
ecutors' association and did not move from the assigned legislative
committee.
In late 1993 and 1994, the national experiments with drug courts
attracted the interest of Washington criminal justice leaders. King
County started a drug court in 1994 and was followed by other coun-
ties. The judge for King County's drug court, Ricardo Martinez, was a
judicial member of the sentencing commission. Judge Martinez earlier
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served as a deputy prosecutor in King County, where he headed the
office's drug unit. Because of his background and his drug court experi-
ences, Judge Martinez was a persuasive advocate for treatment alterna-
tives.
By 1995, Norm Maleng agreed to promote a drug sentencing alter-
native and organized a diverse coalition of supporters, including law
enforcement officials and the sponsors of the "three strikes" and "hard
time" initiatives. The proposal for a "Special Drug Offender Sentenc-
ing Alternative," modeled loosely on the "Special Sex Offender Sen-
tencing Alternative," combined a drug treatment option for those per-
sons with drug addictions while retaining the concept of "prison
sentences for dealers," a consistent feature of Maleng's sentencing pri-
orities. The alternative authorized judges to waive the standard sen-
tence for first-time drug offenders and impose a prison sentence of
one-half of the standard range followed by one year of community-
based drug treatment. Those who violated conditions of the commu-
nity portion of the sentence could be returned to prison for the re-
maining one-half of the standard range (Wash. Rev. Code, tide 9,
chap. 94A, sec. 120 [2001]).
This alternative sentence was projected to reduce the prison popula-
tion by 196 in its second year, 240 in its third, 258 in its fourth year,
then stabilizing at a reduction of 275. More significant was that this
was only the second change to the Sentencing Reform Act since 1984
to reduce the severity of sentences. In practice, use of the alternative
initially fell far short of the projections; only 15 percent of eligible
cases received the alternative sentence in 1995-96 (Engen and Steiger
1997, p. vii).
In 1999, the legislature modified the provision to expand its use. A
sentencing commission study found that judges and prosecutors pre-
ferred the work ethic camp option over the drug treatment sentence
because it was simple and flexible; defendants and their attorneys pre-
ferred it because it involved less confinement time (Du and Phipps
1997, p. 15). The 1999 amendments excluded defendants convicted of
drug offenses from the work ethic camp and authorized judges to set
conditions prohibiting the offender from using alcohol or controlled
substances and requiring performance of other affirmative conditions.
In doing so, the legislature created exceptions to several core policies
of the Sentencing Reform Act, as had previously been done for first-
time offenders and sex offenders. Drug offenders became the third cat-
egory of offenses exempted from the just deserts philosophy. The
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amendments immediately increased use of this alternative; in 2000, 895
offenders received this sentencing option.
C. Two Strikes
In 1996, the legislature extended the principle of the "three strikes"
initiative to those convicted of a second serious sex offense. This action
was not taken in response to a particular case but reflected instead the
view that sex recidivists were particularly dangerous and intractable. In
1997, the listed sex offenses were expanded to include serious sex of-
fenses against children. Upon the second conviction of these desig-
nated offenses, a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment must be im-
posed. The "two strikes" provision has been sparingly applied. One
defendant received a "two strikes" sentence in 1997, two in 1998, four
in 1999, and eight in 2000.
D. Local Discretion
In a little-discussed addition to a bill authorizing drug treatment
sentences, the legislature relaxed the strictness of the Sentencing Re-
form Act on sentences of less than one year. Unlike Minnesota's guide-
lines, in which the presumptive sentence ranges applied only to prison
sentences, Washington's applied to all felony sentences and thus regu-
lated both jail and prison sentences.
The act had always authorized judges to convert any jail sentence
(total confinement of one year or less) to partial confinement (work or
an education release) and to convert up to thirty days of total con-
finement to community service at the rate of eight hours of community
service for one day of total confinement. Local officials have long be-
lieved that the Sentencing Reform Act has caused upward-spiraling jail
costs and have argued that meeting those financial obligations leaves
them without resources to develop alternative sanctions.
The 1999 legislature added a cryptic but potentially powerful sentence
to the provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act governing alternatives to
total confinement: "For offenders convicted of non-violent and non-sex
offenses, the court may authorize county jails to convert jail confinement
to an available county supervised community option and may require the
offender to perform affirmative conduct pursuant to RCW 9.94A.129"
(Wash. Rev. Code, tide 9, chap. 94A, sec. 380[3] [2001]).
No definition of "county supervised community option" was pro-
vided, but there is a clear intent to maximize local discretion. Correc-
tional resources at the county level are the fiscal responsibility of
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county government, and no state funding accompanied the expansion
of direction. To date, little implementation has occurred, but planning
efforts are under way in several counties.
E. Risk-Based Supervision
The 1999 legislature adopted a more fundamental-and far-reach-
ing-policy change addressing correctional supervision of offenders in
the community. The "Offender Accountability Act" was proposed by
Joseph Lehman, who became the secretary of the department of cor-
rections after serving as the head of corrections in Pennsylvania and
Maine. Motivated by the success of community policing in the United
States, as well as calls by some correctional leaders for a "shift in the
missions of correctional agencies" (Smith and Dickey 1999, p. 7), the
corrections chief argued that public safety could be increased by alter-
ing the authority and focus of community corrections staff.
The Offender Accountability Act represents a major shift in policy,
primarily by returning discretion to correctional officers, but it does
not represent either a return to indeterminate sentencing or a total re-
jection of just deserts principles. First, no change is made in the term
of confinement imposed at sentencing. It retains a determinate term,
subject only to reductions based on "good time" calculations. Judges
have no greater discretion over the length of confinement than previ-
ously under the Sentencing Reform Act, nor over the length of com-
munity custody; the judge must impose a sentence within the range of
community custody established by the sentencing commission. Judicial
discretion is expanded in setting conditions of supervision; conditions
can now require affirmative conduct, although they must be "reason-
ably related to the circumstances of the offense" (Vash. Rev. Code,
title 9, chap. 94A, sec. 715 [2001]).
The discretion of corrections officers was substantially increased.
For the first time under the Sentencing Reform Act, they have author-
ity to impose conditions without judicial approval, modify or delete
conditions without judicial approval (although not with regard to judi-
cially imposed conditions), and reduce, although not lengthen, the
term of community custody and discharge the offender without judicial
approval.
Coupled with this increase in discretion is a fundamental shift in the
basis on which discretion is to be exercised. Prior to the Offender Ac-
countability Act, the only explicit authority for considering risk for re-
offending was in the context of exceptional sentences or sex offenders.
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In 1991, the Washington Supreme Court had held that "if future dan-
gerousness is to be considered an aggravating factor in determining the
sentence for non-sexual offense cases, it is the Legislature's province
to make such a decision" (State v. Barnes, 818 P. 2d 1088 [1991]).
The legislation directs the department of corrections to concentrate
its nonprison resources on higher-risk offenders-those in the top
quarter of the risk pool. In authorizing the use of "risk assessment,"
the legislature accepted the view of the department of corrections-
supported by the sentencing commission-that risk prediction accu-
racy had sufficiently improved since the reform was enacted to warrant
a reversal in state policy. The department testified during legislative
hearings that actuarial risk prediction is far superior to informal judg-
ments (Grove and Meehl 1996). The state's move toward risk assess-
ment is one of the four conceptions of sentencing and corrections
identified by Tonry (1999) as currently coexisting in the United States.
The department plans to implement its new authority aggressively.
Pilot projects are under way in which community corrections officers
work directly with police officers in a model based on community po-
licing concepts. The department's intent-and the expanded authority
granted by the legislature-are in accord with the "new penology" de-
scribed by Lyons (1999) and Simon and Feeley (1992). At its core, this
approach emphasizes surveillance and containment. Its purpose is pub-
lic safety, not just deserts, although in Washington it will function
within boundaries established by just deserts. The expanded discretion
in the act will function primarily to increase sentence severity. By in-
creasing the range and nature of allowable sentence conditions, the
state also has expanded its authority to intervene when there are viola-
tions and impose consequences.
F. Prison Population and Sentence Length
Felony convictions continued to increase, reaching 24,391 in 1999,
an 18.3 percent increase over 1995. The average prison sentence length
decreased to 44.2 months (a 6.9 percent decrease from 1995), while the
average jail sentence length increased slightly (from 2.7 months in 1995
to 2.8 months in 1999). Imprisonment rates increased by 18.4 percent,
from 212 per 100,000 population in 1995 to 251 per 100,000 in 1999,
slightly more than the 15.8 percent national increase from 411 per
100,000 in 1995 to 476 per 100,000 in 1999 (Sentencing Guidelines
Commission 1999b, p. 9; Bureau of Justice Statistics 2000, p. 3).
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VI. Reflections
In a democracy, resolution of policy issues is inherently political, and
sentencing reform in Washington has been a political process in which
the legislature reasserted its primacy. The initial reform, now almost
two decades old, employed presumptive guidelines to "structure but
not eliminate discretionary decisions affecting sentences" (Wash. Rev.
Code, title 9, chap. 94A, sec. 010 [2001]). The structure remains intact,
and the state continues to operate with a sentencing grid that weighs
offense seriousness and an offender score, and produces an applicable
sentencing range. Sentencing policies, however, have repeatedly been
modified. The central issues do not change, but their resolution, by
various decision makers, over time, does change.
Washington's experience has been one of continuous change, with
every issue-and its resolution-potentially in political play. This, of
course, is neither new nor unique to Washington. Sentencing has al-
ways been inherently political. What is distinctive about Washing-
ton-and we suggest other guideline states-is that legislative policy
direction has shifted from the "big picture" issues to detailed particu-
lars-with rules governing everything from the weight given to prior
convictions to the conditions of supervision to determining eligibility
for a boot camp.
Pragmatism has always trumped philosophical purity in this state.
Washington's initial reform was radical for its time-it rejected the
premises of the indeterminate model and adopted a system based on
just deserts that significantly constrained the discretion of judges and
correctional officials. Subsequent changes exhibit a more complex pat-
tern. Many have resolved issues within the just deserts paradigm, while
others have incorporated concepts from other models. However, the
fundamental structure of the reform has been retained. Perhaps this
approach had political advantages because it involved incremental ad-
justments and did not threaten institutional stability. Seen this way, the
structure of Washington's sentencing guidelines is agnostic as to how
fundamental issues of sentencing should be resolved, but it is power-
fully effective at implementing whatever resolution is produced by the
political process (Boerner 1993).
The effects of so much change have produced a sentencing system
far more complex than the original proposal. Changes have focused on
particular crimes or groups of crimes and were largely, at least origi-
nally, consistent with the legislature's original direction to "emphasize
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confinement for the violent offender" (Wash. Rev. Code, title 9,
chap. 94A, sec. 040[5] [2001]).
A. Prison Population Changes
Since the 1984 guidelines took effect, felony convictions increased by
206.7 percent, from 7,953 in 1985 to 24,391 in 1999. Average prison
sentence length remained essentially level (43.9 months in 1985 com-
pared with 44.2 months in 1999), while the percentage of convicted fel-
ons receiving prison rather than jail sentences went from 16.6 percent
in 1985 to 29.1 percent in 1999, an increase of 75.3 percent. The rate
of imprisonment per 100,000 population also increased, but at a lower
rate. From a level of 156 per 100,000 population in 1985, imprisonment
rates reached a level of 251 per 100,000 in 1999, an increase of 60.9
percent (Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1999b, p. 9).
The significance of these increases becomes apparent when the data
are compared with national trends. The national imprisonment rate in-
creased by 138 percent, from 200 per 100,000 population in 1985 to
476 per 100,000 in 1999. Washington's increase was less than one-half
of the national average increase. The political climate in Washington
was not significantly different from that in the rest of the country. Pas-
sions ran high and the public mood became increasingly punitive.
What was different, we submit, was that the structure of the guidelines
focused those punitive instincts on specific categories of crime. Not
once during the entire period was there an across-the-board increase
in sentence severity. Washington's guidelines thus seem to have mod-
erated the public's punitive passion, not by attempting to deny it, but
by channeling it more narrowly than would otherwise have happened.
The policy changes aimed at increasing prison use did so, but primarily
for the targeted offenses, as figures 3 and 4 show. Figures 3 and 4 dis-
play the state's prison admissions over time and the forecasted changes
attributed to each sentencing amendment enacted through 1998.
Evaluations of sentencing guidelines nationally have found similar
effects in guideline states in which prison populations were explicitly
considered (Marvel 1995, p. 707; Reitz 2001, pp. 12-13). Washing-
ton's experience, however, is even more striking when compared with
its fellow early guideline states, Minnesota and Pennsylvania. The im-
prisonment rate in Minnesota increased 123 percent from 1985 to
1999 (from 56 per 100,000 population in 1985 to 125 per 100,000 in
1999). In Pennsylvania, the rate increased by 156 percent (from 119
per 100,000 in 1985 to 305 per 100,000 in 1999) (Bureau of Justice
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FIG. 3.-Historical and forecast prison admissions
Statistics 1998, p. 491). We do not know why Washington's experience
is so different from that of Minnesota and Pennsylvania, but it seems
clear that the Washington guidelines have been more effective at chan-
neling the public's passion for punishment.
B. Changes in Discretion
The initial reform altered decision-making authority over sentenc-
ing, eliminating parole release, restricting the use of probation condi-
tions, narrowing judges' discretion, and shifting power to prosecutors.
The reformers' revised allocation of discretion was not stable, and
those parties who lost discretion have pursued legislative avenues to
have it returned. The following table outlines the shifts in the alloca-
tion of sentencing discretion in Washington (see table 2).
As can be seen in table 2, the legislature did not "structure" all dis-
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FIG. 4.-Cumulative effects of criminal justice legislation, 1986-2000 sessions
cretionary decisions affecting sentencing in the same manner. In this
concluding section, we address Washington's experience in con-
straining prosecutorial, judicial, and correctional discretion.
1. Prosecutorial Discretion. Washington sentencing reformers in the
1970s and early 1980s recognized that prosecutorial discretion was a
major portion of the "discretionary decision affecting sentences" that
the 1981 act sought to "structure but not eliminate" (Wash. Rev.
Code, tide 9, chap. 94A, sec. 010 [2001]). Washington's prosecutors
were not granted additional discretionary authority, but the restric-
tions on judicial discretion and elimination of correctional discretion
significantly increased the relative power of prosecutors. The legisla-
tion took account of this by directing the sentencing commission to
"devise recommended prosecuting standards in respect to charging of
offenses and plea agreements" (Wash. Rev. Code, title 9, chap. 94A,
sec. 040[2][b] [2001]).
The commission took this task seriously and developed the most
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comprehensive set of prosecutorial guidelines ever proposed for legis-
lative adoption. The commission chose to make the guidelines volun-
tary. Not surprisingly, the courts held that a claim that a prosecutor
had not followed the prosecutorial guidelines was not subject to judi-
cial review (State v. Lee, 847 P. 2d 25 [Wash. App. 1993]). This meant
that the guidelines were effective only insofar as prosecutors chose to
follow them. Since the guidelines grew out of earlier collective efforts
by prosecutors to articulate policies to guide their own discretionary
decisions, that the guidelines were voluntary did not mean they were
ignored. The decentralized nature of prosecution in Washington-
each of the thirty-nine counties has an independently elected prosecu-
tor and the attorney general has no supervisory or general enforcement
powers-meant, however, that regional differences developed, particu-
larly over time, as different prosecutors adopted different policies.
A striking example concerns drug enforcement. The sentencing
guidelines call for a presumptive sentence of twenty-one to twenty-
seven months for a first offense sale of heroin or cocaine and zero to
ninety days for first-offense possession. In King County, Norm Ma-
leng has consistently maintained a policy that drug sales charges are
not reduced from sale to possession, even to reward a plea of guilty.
As depicted in table 3, of the 1,866 drug cases in King County in 1998,
1,131 (61 percent) were convictions for dealing. This contrasts with
only 30 percent in the rest of the state. Now, of course, it may be that
this contrast to some degree reflects different behavior patterns, with
dealers congregating in King County. However, as prosecutors readily
acknowledge, the difference is due to different enforcement, charging,
TABLE 3
Type of Drug Convictions by County
Dealing Nondealing
County Convictions Convictions Total
King 1,131 (61%) 735 (39%) 1,866
Pierce 428 (27%) 1,159 (73%) 1,587
Clark 134 (26%) 381 (74%) 515
Snohomish 130 (28%) 339 (72%) 469
Thurston 71 (17%) 340 (78%) 411
Other counties 1,005 (34%) 1,947 (66%) 2,952
Total 2,899 (37%) 4,901 (63%) 7,800
Total less King County 1,768 (30%) 4,166 (70%) 5,934
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and plea bargaining policies. In adjacent and demographically similar
Pierce County, where prosecutorial policies allow a reduction of deal-
ing charges to possession in return for a guilty plea, of 1,587 drug
cases, 428 (27 percent) were convictions for dealing. Policies in both
counties are explicit and are publicly defended by the prosecutors who
adopted them.
The effect of these policy differences is significant (table 3). Were
King County to have adopted the policies followed in the rest of the
state, 503 fewer drug offenders would have been committed to prison
in 1998. Were King to have followed Pierce County's policy, there
would have been 556 fewer prison admissions. However, King Coun-
ty's policies appear more accurately to follow the prosecutorial guide-
lines adopted by the legislature. They call for prosecutors to "file
charges which adequately describe the nature of the defendant's con-
duct" (Wash. Rev. Code, title 9, chap. 94A, sec. 440 [2001]) and that
"a defendant will normally be expected to plead guilty to the charge
... which adequately describe the nature of his or her conduct or go
to trial" (Wash. Rev. Code, title 9, chap. 94A, sec. 450 [2001]).
Were the rest of the state's prosecutors to follow King County's-
and the legislature's-policies, however, the effect would have been
even more dramatic. Rather than 1,768 drug offenders convicted of
dealing-and thus receiving prison sentences-3,572 would have been
convicted, an increase of over 1,800 prison admissions. Since the me-
dian sentence imposed on dealers in Washington in 1998 was 27.6
months, this shift would significantly have increased the prison popula-
tion.
The geographical disparity raises significant policy issues. Washing-
ton's drug laws are enacted by the state legislature and, in the words
of the Sentencing Reform Act, are to be "applied equally throughout
the state." However, disparity of this type is the product of Washing-
ton's allegiance to local control, with prosecutors being politically ac-
countable only to their local electorate.
Washington's prosecutors' practices (with the exception of Maleng's
in King County) demonstrate what Stuart Scheingold termed "policy
moderation at the local level," by which he means that symbolic politi-
cization of crime is strongest when furthest removed from the applica-
tion of the symbolic policies (Scheingold 1991, p. 83). Prosecutors are
inherently pragmatists in that they fashion policies that work in their
local contexts. Commitment to the principle that every defendant
ought to be convicted of what he or she has done, and no less, is much
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easier when it is disconnected from the reality of managing scarce re-
sources. Maleng, not surprisingly, given his long commitment to sen-
tencing reform, seeks to implement the policies he helped forge. His
colleagues do not share his viewpoint. The legislature was, of course,
quite aware of the decentralized autonomy of Washington's prosecu-
tors when it chose to make the prosecutorial guidelines aspirational
rather than binding. It chose to sanction local decision making and the
inevitable geographical disparity it produces (Boerner 1995, pp. 196-
200).
What Washington's experience leaves unexplored is whether judicial
review could effectively have enforced prosecutorial guidelines. Cer-
tainly Washington's experience with judicial review of departures from
the sentencing guidelines, which we discuss next, demonstrates the ef-
ficacy of judicial review. Prosecutorial decision making, however, in-
volves issues not present at sentencing, when the crime of conviction
is set, and defines the starting point. Judicial review of a sentence that
departs from the guidelines considers whether the reasons given by the
judge for sentencing outside the presumptive range are legally suffi-
cient; there is no review as to whether the starting point was correctly
determined. Prosecutorial decision making, however, operates in an
environment in which the crime of conviction has not been deter-
mined but is the central issue for determination. This determination
involves evidentiary sufficiency, so its subjective nature is apparent.
Washington's prosecutorial guidelines recognize that one circum-
stance that may justify a plea bargain-euphemistically termed a "plea
agreement"-is "evidentiary problems which make conviction on the
original charges doubtful" (Wash. Rev. Code, title 9, chap. 94A, sec.
450[2] [20011). The myriad factors that influence a judgment related
to likely conviction of a particular crime or crimes, to say nothing of
their relative weights, involves polycentric decision making not readily
susceptible to judicial review. There is no meaningful external standard
against which to measure the subjective discretionary decision. Review
of judges' decisions to depart from guidelines, by contrast, involves the
comparatively clear-cut question of whether a particular reason justi-
fies an exception.
Reviewing a departure from the prosecutorial guidelines that is said
to be justified by "evidentiary problems" would require an intrusive
and time-consuming examination of all aspects of the prosecutor's
case. This examination can be done-supervisors in prosecutors' of-
fices do it every day-but judges are ill suited to the task. The basis
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for the determination is subjective-involving the quality of witnesses
and the persuasiveness of inferences-and involves the confidential
work product of the prosecutor.
In addition, this review must occur in a nonadversarial environment.
Once a plea bargain is struck, both the prosecutor and the defense at-
torneys share an interest in its acceptance. Neither would argue against
a position to which they just agreed. Thus, judges would be denied the
adversarial testing present in appellate review of judges' sentences, and
in nearly all other instances of judicial review. They would be forced
to become active investigators of circumstances rather than passive
evaluators of arguments-a role most judges are reluctant to under-
take.
There may be resolutions to these issues, but Washington's experi-
ence does not provide them. Washington's prosecutorial guidelines re-
main voluntary and thus, as Hobbes put it, "mere words" (Hobbes
1946). The statutory requirement that "the court, at the time of the
plea, shall determine if the agreement is consistent with the interests
of justice and the prosecuting standards" is routinely satisfied by a pre-
printed judicial finding in the standard sentencing form that "the
agreement is consistent with the interests of justice and the prosecut-
ing standards" (Wash. Rev. Code, title 9, chap. 94A, sec. 090 [2001]).
2. Judicial Discretion and Appellate Sentencing Review. Recognizing
that the solution to what was perceived as excessive judicial discretion
was not to reject discretion entirely, the reformers sought instead the
right mix of rule and discretion, the proper balance between the need
for articulated principles governing sentencing and for flexibility to de-
part from the consequences of those principles when necessary to
achieve a just result.
The guidelines provide the external standard necessary to constrain
discretion. Yet the Washington reformers' intent was to structure, not
eliminate, judicial discretion, and thus the guidelines were made pre-
sumptive, not mandatory. Departures were permitted when justified by
"substantial and compelling reasons" (Wash. Rev. Code, title 9,
chap. 94A, sec. 120[2] [2001]). The challenge was to determine which
reasons met this standard and which did not. The commission devel-
oped, and the legislature adopted a list of aggravating and mitigating
factors to guide judicial discretion, but both recognized that they could
not anticipate every individual situation deserving a departure. The
listed factors were prefaced with the statement that they were "illus-
trative only and not intended to be exclusive reasons for exceptional
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sentence" (Wash. Rev. Code, title 9, chap. 94A, sec. 390 [2001]). The
intent was for substantive appellate review eventually to develop a
"common law of sentencing within the state" (Wash. Rev. Code, title
9, chap. 94A, sec. 210[6] [2001]).
This promise has been realized. A rich body of reported decisions,
now numbering in the hundreds, construe and apply the legislative di-
rections. The cases are not all consistent, to be sure, and no single
reader will agree with every decision, but the cases are a model of the
common law process, an amalgam of principle and policy that brings
rationality and consistency to sentencing decisions. An example is illus-
trative. Sentencing based on predictions of offenders' future behavior
was a hallmark of the prior indeterminate sentencing system. Judges
sought to protect the public by imposing sentences designed to prevent
future criminal behavior through the effects of rehabilitation, deter-
rence, and incapacitation. Inherent was the problematic practice of
prediction. Criticisms of the accuracy of such predictions were at the
core of the arguments that led to the adoption of the Sentencing Re-
form Act (e.g., Morris 1974).
Basing a predictive judgment on past criminal history, which is the
most accurate of available predictors, runs afoul of two central precepts
of the Sentencing Reform Act-the principle that factors, such as
criminal history, used to determine the sentence range cannot be used
again as a basis for departing from that range, and the prohibition on
use of prior criminal behavior that had not resulted in conviction
(Wash. Rev. Code, title 9, chap. 94A, sec. 370 [2001]). In addition, the
predictive nature of the enterprise embodies a central tenet of the re-
jected rehabilitative ideal, that predictions of defendants' future acts
can be made.
In the early years, the courts of appeals grappled with these issues
in a series of contradictory decisions. In the first, the court stated, "We
would uphold an exceptional sentence for one who demonstrates a pat-
tern of predatory sexual offenses upon particularly vulnerable victims,
yet who cannot be treated for the deviancy" (State v. Wood, 709 P. 2d
1209 [Wash. App. 1985]). The next year, the court of appeals held,
without analysis, that "the defendant's lack of amenability to treatment
and likelihood of reoffending... is a substantial and compelling reason
justifying an exception sentence" (State v. Harp, 717 P. 2d 282 [Wash.
App. 1986]).
Later that year, an aggravated exceptional sentence based solely on
"the defendant's propensity to reoffend" was reversed (State v. Payne,
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726 P. 2d 997 [Wash. App. 1986]). Responding to the argument that
exceptional sentences furthered the legislative purpose "to protect the
public," the court stated that it "was not persuaded that the Legislature
intended preventative detention to further that purpose" (State v.
Payne, 1000). The court observed that "reliance on a psychologist's
prediction of future dangerousness, without any history of similar acts
or other corroborating evidence, not only allows wide latitude for
abuse, it also undermines those general objectives of proportionality
and uniformity" (State v. Payne, 1000). Relying on the legislature's di-
rection that the sentencing guidelines be applied without discrimina-
tion as to any element not relating to the crime or the defendant's
criminal history, the court held that "an offender's personality or pre-
dicted dangerousness, standing alone, is not a proper basis for a dura-
tional departure" (State v. Payne, 1000).
In the next case, however, the court of appeals distinguished Payne
as holding only that a court should not rely solely on the offender's
personality or predicted dangerousness without any history of similar
acts or other corroborating evidence and concluded, "given a history
of similar acts or other corroborating evidence, the court may enhance
the sentence on the basis of a considered assessment of future danger-
ousness" (State v. Olive, 734 P. 2d 36 [Wash. App. 1987]). The court
of appeals required that a finding of future dangerousness include both
a history of similar acts and proven nonamenability to treatment.
In 1990, the issue first reached the supreme court that affirmed the
court of appeals' requirement that "both a history of similar acts and
lack of amenability to treatment" were necessary (State v. Pryor, 779
P. 2d 244 [Wash. 1990]). The court saw the dual requirement as ful-
filling "two important considerations. First, it ensures that a defen-
dant's criminal history, which has already been taken into account in
determining the appropriate standard sentence range, will not be used
again to further enhance the same sentence without further proof of
dangerousness.... Second, amenability to treatment, or lack thereof,
is crucial in assessing the likelihood an individual may pose to the pub-
lic in the future" (State v. Pryor, 248-49).
The supreme court revisited the issue the following year in a review
of several cases, not involving sex crimes, where future dangerousness
was used to justify an aggravated departure. A three-judge plurality
opinion reviewed the goals and structure of the Sentencing Reform Act
and found that allowing consideration of future dangerousness gener-
ally violated both the principle that factors used in determining the
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standard range could not be used again and the prohibition on using
facts that had not resulted in conviction. Considering the legislative
history of the Sentencing Reform Act, the plurality found the different
fundamental assumptions governing sentencing of sex offenders pro-
vided "authority for this court to consider a defendant's amenability to
treatment in sexual offense cases" (State v. Barnes, 818 P. 2d 1088
[Wash. 1991], p. 1091) but not others. The plurality stated "if future
dangerousness is to be considered an aggravating factor in determining
the sentence for non-sexual offense cases, it is the legislature's province
to make such a decision" (State v. Barnes, 1093). Three concurring jus-
tices agreed that extending consideration of future dangerousness to
non-sexual offense cases "lies properly within the province of the Leg-
islature" (State v. Barnes, 1094).
Subsequent decisions have been faithful to the principles enunciated
in Pryor and Barnes. A series of cases has applied those strictures re-
gardless of the labels used by sentencing judges. Courts have held that
findings of "protection of the public" (State v. Post, 826 P. 2d 172
[Wash. 1992]), "lack of amenability to treatment and the extraordinary
danger the defendant presents to women" (State v. Ross, 861 P. 2d 473
[Wash. 1992]), "threat to the community" (State v. George, 834 P. 2d
664 [Wash. App. 1992]), and "a strong proclivity to commit these
kinds of crimes" (State v. Hicks, 888 P. 2d 1235 [1995]) are all func-
tional equivalents of a future dangerousness finding and thus subject
to the limitation to sexual offenses required by Barnes and the two-
prong objective justification required by Pryor.
The cases cited above typify the approach taken by Washington's
appellate courts in reviewing exceptional sentences. While one can
quibble with the result in a particular area, the methodology and the
overall results demonstrate that law has come to sentencing in Wash-
ington.
3. Judicial Discretion and Racial Disparity. There remains the issue
of disparity. One main argument in support of guidelines was that they
would reduce disparity in general and racial disparity in particular.
Here the promise has been achieved, at least in part. While in Wash-
ington, like most jurisdictions, members of minority groups, on aver-
age, receive more severe sentences than whites, the differences are ac-
counted for by differences in legally relevant variables-the offense of
conviction and prior criminal record. There are no significant differ-
ences in sentences imposed under the guidelines for those convicted of
the same crime with the same offender score (Fallen 1987, pp. 62-64;
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TABLE 4
First-Time Offender Departures
Below Sentence Within or Above
Range Sentence Range Total
White 408 (33%) 827 (67%) 1,235
Black 26 (15%) 143 (85%) 169
Other 30 (22%) 108 (78%) 138
SoURcE.-Fallen 1987, p. 68.
Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1997, p. 11-1; Engen, Gainey, and
Steen 1999, p. 2).
Similarly, judicial authority to impose exceptional sentences under
the court's departure authority shows little evidence of disparity corre-
lated with race. "Whites and blacks have virtually the same exceptional
sentence rates; other minorities are less likely to receive an exceptional
sentence" (Fallen 1987, p. 65).
However, significant racial disparity has been found in the use of
other alternatives to the presumptive sentence range (i.e., the first-time
offender and sex offender sentencing alternatives). Table 4 depicts dif-
ferences by race in 1987 among eligible defendants who received first-
time offender sentences.
Whites were more than twice as likely as blacks to receive sentences
less than the presumptive range when such a downward departure was
authorized. The pattern is similar, although not as pronounced, for
other minorities. Sentences imposed under the sex offender alternative
show the same disparities. This alternative authorizes substitution of a
community treatment sentence with not more than six months in jail
for a prison sentence. Table 5 depicts the differences.
TABLE 5






SouRcE.-Fallen 1987, p. 68.
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Data reported by the Sentencing Guidelines Commission in 1997
revealed the same disparities (Sentencing Guidelines Commission
1997, pp. 11-1 to 11-9). In 1998, 37 percent of eligible white offenders
received first-time offender sentences, while only 25 percent of eligible
black offenders and 22.5 percent of eligible members of other minority
groups received such sentences (Sentencing Guidelines Commission
2000a, p. 7).
A study of drug sentences imposed between July 1, 1995, and De-
cember 31, 1998 demonstrates the same pattern. Both black and His-
panic defendants were found less likely to receive first-time offender
sentences than whites (Engen, Gainey, and Steen 1999, p. 51), and the
authors concluded that "significant differences by race and ethnicity
in the use of alternative sanctions exist even controlling for legal and
extra-legal characteristics" (Engen, Gainey, and Steen 1999, p. 3).
What can we learn from these conclusions? Clearly, sentencing
guidelines can effectively structure judicial discretion so as to eliminate
the influence of race and ethnicity as a variable. Imposing sentences
within the presumptive range and granting exceptional sentences are
decisions that are constrained by the guidelines. The applicable sen-
tence range is determined solely by the crime of conviction and prior
criminal history. Exceptional sentences must be justified by explicit
findings of "substantial and compelling circumstances" and are subject
to substantive appellate review. The act retains unstructured and unre-
viewed discretion for sentencing judges in cases in which the offender
is eligible for the first-time offender and the sex offender sentencing
alternatives. No criteria for use are provided, and the exercise of judi-
cial discretion is not subject to review. In these circumstances, and only
in these circumstances, racial disparity emerges. The lesson is power-
ful: racial disparity is correlated with unstructured and unreviewed dis-
cretion.
4. Correctional Discretion. Initially, Washington's reform addressed
correctional discretion by its partial abolition; parole and probation
were prospectively repealed, and correctional officials could vary
length or conditions of sentence only by granting or denying good
time while in the institution. This decision was, and has remained,
deeply resented by many in corrections. Arguing that it is denied the
necessary authority to protect the public, the department of correc-
tions has repeatedly pursued the reinstatement of its authority. The
1999 legislature, persuaded by these arguments, returned authority to
corrections officials to assess individual risk and to tailor conditions
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and supervise offenders in the community pursuant to their risk assess-
ments.
The explicit authority in the Offender Accountability Act to use risk
predictions in determining the conditions, intensity, and duration of
postrelease supervision raises a series of issues about how the new au-
thority will be exercised. Initially, there is the challenge of implemen-
tation. The department of corrections has been granted authority to
supervise over 20,000 offenders each year, on the basis of individual
assessments of risk, with a staff that for almost two decades has played
a comparatively passive role. Converting community corrections offi-
cers into the proactive agents of surveillance and intervention contem-
plated by the "community justice" model presents formidable manage-
ment challenges (see, e.g., Smith and Dickey 1999). The challenge is
greater because essentially no new resources have been provided. In-
creased surveillance and intervention with high-risk offenders will be
possible only by shifting resources from lower-risk offenders. Inevita-
bly, an offender assessed to be medium or low risk will commit an atro-
cious crime. Retrospective scrutiny, influenced by hindsight bias, will
reveal that more intensive supervision was allowed but not undertaken.
The authors of the risk assessment instrument that will be used in
Washington are candid about their assessment of its accuracy. False-
positive predictors (estimates of failures that do not occur) occur in 30
percent of cases, while false-negative predictions (a risk exists but is
not predicted) occur in only 2 to 3 percent of the cases (Andrews and
Bonta 1995, p. 49). Such a bias is justified on public safety grounds; it
is preferable to overpredict rather than underpredict if the goal is pub-
lic safety alone. From a just deserts perspective, however, taking con-
trol over a person beyond what is deserved for the crime on the basis
of a prediction of future behavior is unjust (Morris 1974, pp. 80-84).
To do so on the basis of an inaccurate prediction is even more unjust.
This tension is increased when risk is determined, in part, by subjec-
tive criteria which are susceptible to racial disparity. Assessments of of-
fender attitudes, both current and past, are part of the determiners of
risk. We know that subjective assessments are quite likely to be racially
disparate. A recent Washington study illustrates this. In a review of
233 narrative reports from juvenile probation officers, researchers
found that probation officers consistently portray the cause of black
offenders' delinquency as negative attitudinal and personality traits,
while the environment is more frequently used to explain delinquency
by white youths. These attributions are not benign; they were found
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to influence assessments of future dangerousness and served a key role
in sentence recommendations (Bridges and Steen 1998, p. 567). We
see no reason to believe that similar disparities will not be found in the
continuing assessments of risk called for by the Offender Accountabil-
ity Act.
There remain the consequences of the myriad decentralized discre-
tionary decisions inherent in supervising thousands of offenders. Given
the inevitability of scarce supervisory resources, how will those re-
sources be allocated? Will, for example, geographical concentrations
of high-risk offenders be targeted for surveillance? Considerations of
public safety and efficiency will argue strongly to do so. Surveillance
of equal numbers of offenders of equal risk who are dispersed widely
through the community would consume significantly greater re-
sources. The choice is obvious, is it not? But, of course, we need not
guess; we know the race of those concentrated high-risk offenders just
as we know the race of those dispersed equally high-risk offenders.
And, we know the race of those offenders who will be found in viola-
tion of the conditions of their supervision. We do not suggest that this
result is the intended consequence of the grant of discretionary author-
ity. Yet, it is foreseeable and our experience counsels caution (Tonry
1994, pp. 104-15).
Washington's experience with sentencing reform demonstrates that
techniques exist that can effectively "structure but not eliminate" dis-
cretion. Policy choices can effectively be translated into individual sen-
tencing decisions consistent with those policy choices. Whether these
techniques can be applied effectively beyond sentencing is an open
question. Certainly, Washington's experience with external constraints
on prosecutorial discretion does not offer much hope. Perhaps Wash-
ington's correctional administrators will develop techniques to struc-
ture and constrain the discretion that has been returned to them. And,
of course, there remains the issue of whether constraining discretion
is a good idea. For those who see sentencing as an inherently individu-
alized human process, this entire enterprise will remain flawed. For
those, however, who see discretion as both inevitable and troubling,
Washington's experience has been instructive, and will continue to be.
C. Conclusion
Any evaluation of a sentencing reform must begin with the recogni-
tion of its transitory nature. There are no new issues in sentencing,
only provisional resolutions of age-old issues. The enduring question
is, When will each resolution itself be reformed? As we reflect on the
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past quarter century of sentencing reform in Washington, we see a
continuous process, informed by principle but tempered by pragma-
tism, with each stage reflecting the consensus of the moment.
This perspective arises from viewing sentencing as a process, not an
end, a continuing attempt to reconcile the multiple inconsistent pur-
poses of sentencing and apply them to individual cases in a manner
seen as fair by all. The process is collective; sentencing is done in all
our names. Since we do not all agree on these issues, the incentive for
change is always present. Perhaps not surprisingly, since we were active
participants at the time, we favor the consensus of the mid-1980s over
that which currently exists, but we also believe the current status to be
preferable to that which existed in 1980. These are subjective judg-
ments, of course, and our views are entitled to no more weight than
those of any other citizen.
What we believe there can be no doubt about, however, is that the
process by which sentencing policy is determined and applied has be-
come visible, resolved for the major part by public debate and not by
low-visibility decision makers. Law has come to sentencing in Wash-
ington, and law evolves by public, not private decision making. Law's
inevitable partner, politics, is a part of that process and inevitably
means that there will be winners and losers, step by step, issue by issue.
The process is not elegant, and the results are not fully consistent, but
the alternatives, in our judgment, are worse. Our experience with sen-
tencing when it was a series of low-visibility discretionary decisions,
informed mainly by the values of the decision makers, leaves us with
the firm belief that Washington's current sentencing system is more
just than the one that preceded it. We are equally firm in our belief
that it can be made more just. And so we continue to work.
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